From D.Yanow at fsw.vu.nl Sun Mar 1 08:04:01 2009 From: D.Yanow at fsw.vu.nl (Dvora Yanow) Date: Sun, 1 Mar 2009 14:04:01 +0100 Subject: [Interpretationandmethods] List information Message-ID: <5286BEEC21FADA47A24AA92D8BC9270E028A397A@fswmail01.scw.vu.nl> An HTML attachment was scrubbed... URL: http://listserv.cddc.vt.edu/pipermail/interpretationandmethods/attachments/20090301/81cd4283/attachment.html From D.Yanow at fsw.vu.nl Sun Mar 1 08:34:44 2009 From: D.Yanow at fsw.vu.nl (Dvora Yanow) Date: Sun, 1 Mar 2009 14:34:44 +0100 Subject: [Interpretationandmethods] game theory NOW interpretive methods and methodologies References: <20090227153941.iz2ea17xbc4o8okg@webmail.csbs.utah.edu><5286BEEC21FADA47A24AA92D8BC9270E028A3967@fswmail01.scw.vu.nl> <885A9E9F-BC14-4743-99BC-17BFD1515836@gmail.com> Message-ID: <5286BEEC21FADA47A24AA92D8BC9270E028A397E@fswmail01.scw.vu.nl> An HTML attachment was scrubbed... URL: http://listserv.cddc.vt.edu/pipermail/interpretationandmethods/attachments/20090301/7067ba27/attachment-0001.html From patrickthaddeusjackson at gmail.com Sun Mar 1 08:45:55 2009 From: patrickthaddeusjackson at gmail.com (Patrick Thaddeus Jackson) Date: Sun, 1 Mar 2009 08:45:55 -0500 Subject: [Interpretationandmethods] game theory NOW interpretive methods and methodologies In-Reply-To: <5286BEEC21FADA47A24AA92D8BC9270E028A397E@fswmail01.scw.vu.nl> References: <20090227153941.iz2ea17xbc4o8okg@webmail.csbs.utah.edu><5286BEEC21FADA47A24AA92D8BC9270E028A3967@fswmail01.scw.vu.nl> <885A9E9F-BC14-4743-99BC-17BFD1515836@gmail.com> <5286BEEC21FADA47A24AA92D8BC9270E028A397E@fswmail01.scw.vu.nl> Message-ID: On Mar 1, 2009, at 8:34 AM, Dvora Yanow wrote: > Ok, Patrick, let me see if I can make clearer what I have in mind. > > First, I find it useful to distinguish between methods for > "collecting/gathering" [not my preferred choice of terminology, but > that's what most methods books use, informed by a realist notion of > an external world], or accessing [a bit better], or generating and/ > or co-generating data; and methods for analyzing those data once one > has them in hand, so to speak. If we make this distinction, then I > think many discussions/debates become clearer. I'm also dissatisfied with the conventional terminology. I kind of like "enacted" -- i.e. here are our assumptions (methodology) and here they are being used in a concrete empirical setting (method). > > > The former -- observing/participating, talking, reading -- are used, > solely or in combination, in a wide range of approaches, including > ethnography and participant observation, both of which can be either > realist or interpretivist in orientation/presuppositions. I buy that too, although I wouldn't have thought it possible just a few years ago -- I had usually thought that ethnographic techniques were philosophically monist by definition. I till think there's an elective affinity between those two orientations, but it's by no means a logical necessity. > > > If used in an interpretive mode, however, I see no difference > between those as methods -- that "insist that we enter the lifeworld > of our informants and see things from their point of view, at least > to begin with" -- and an interpretive methodological orientation > that "insists that producers of knowledge are not constitutively > separate from their objects of knowledge, but are co-constituted > with the through the hermeneutic circle and other kinds of mutual > implication of subject and object," to which I would add the > intersubjectivity of phenomenology. > > I.e., I cannot imagine using "interpretive" methods, interpretively, > entering others' lifeworlds, without at the same time accepting the > "interpretive" methodological stance that the "knowledge generation" > that ensues is collaboratively done [i.e., between researcher and > 'researched']. That's the "elective affinity" I was talking about. I agree with you, but there are also critical realists who place the construction of knowledge on a different epistemic (and, I would say, philosophical- ontological) basis even though they also use participant-observation and ethnographic techniques. I find the debate between John Shotter and Roy Bhaskar instructive on this; Shotter's brilliant little book _Conversational Realities_ has an Afterword by Bhaskar that expresses some of the differences. (I would also note in passing that while Shotter invited Bhaskar to contribute to Shotter's book, most critical realists do not reciprocate by inviting constructionists to contribute to theirs. Make of that what you will.) > > > I suspect that the difference you draw emerges from the fact that > those 3 methods of accessing/generating data are also used by those > who do not share an interpretive methodological project with its > ontological and epistemological presuppositions. > > I'd be interested in knowing if we disagree on this. No argument here -- we're in agreement. PTJ === Patrick Thaddeus Jackson Director of General Education, American University Editor-in-Chief, Journal of International Relations and Development http://profptj.blogspot.com | http://www.kittenboo.com calendar: http://ical.mac.com/onyxdr/Patrick -------------- next part -------------- An HTML attachment was scrubbed... URL: http://listserv.cddc.vt.edu/pipermail/interpretationandmethods/attachments/20090301/904a16fd/attachment.html From D.Yanow at fsw.vu.nl Sun Mar 1 09:26:57 2009 From: D.Yanow at fsw.vu.nl (Dvora Yanow) Date: Sun, 1 Mar 2009 15:26:57 +0100 Subject: [Interpretationandmethods] game theory NOW interpretive methods and methodologies References: <20090227153941.iz2ea17xbc4o8okg@webmail.csbs.utah.edu><5286BEEC21FADA47A24AA92D8BC9270E028A3967@fswmail01.scw.vu.nl><885A9E9F-BC14-4743-99BC-17BFD1515836@gmail.com><5286BEEC21FADA47A24AA92D8BC9270E028A397E@fswmail01.scw.vu.nl> Message-ID: <5286BEEC21FADA47A24AA92D8BC9270E028A3983@fswmail01.scw.vu.nl> An HTML attachment was scrubbed... URL: http://listserv.cddc.vt.edu/pipermail/interpretationandmethods/attachments/20090301/62206023/attachment.html From D.Yanow at fsw.vu.nl Sun Mar 1 09:28:56 2009 From: D.Yanow at fsw.vu.nl (Dvora Yanow) Date: Sun, 1 Mar 2009 15:28:56 +0100 Subject: [Interpretationandmethods] Visual Analysis NOW political cartoons References: Message-ID: <5286BEEC21FADA47A24AA92D8BC9270E028A3985@fswmail01.scw.vu.nl> An HTML attachment was scrubbed... URL: http://listserv.cddc.vt.edu/pipermail/interpretationandmethods/attachments/20090301/d04b7956/attachment-0001.html From tfcarver at earthlink.net Sun Mar 1 10:45:16 2009 From: tfcarver at earthlink.net (tfcarver at earthlink.net) Date: Sun, 1 Mar 2009 15:45:16 +0000 (GMT+00:00) Subject: [Interpretationandmethods] Visual Analysis NOW political cartoons Message-ID: <28340113.1235922316412.JavaMail.root@mswamui-billy.atl.sa.earthlink.net> An HTML attachment was scrubbed... URL: http://listserv.cddc.vt.edu/pipermail/interpretationandmethods/attachments/20090301/0b3b0f76/attachment.html From adcockr at gwu.edu Sun Mar 1 13:20:46 2009 From: adcockr at gwu.edu (Robert Adcock) Date: Sun, 01 Mar 2009 13:20:46 -0500 Subject: [Interpretationandmethods] Interpretivism and ethics In-Reply-To: References: Message-ID: Dear all, This exchange has been fantastic! I want to single in on one key issue that's come up in particular in the contributions by Patrick and Bill. Patrick stressed that ethical choices/commitments underwrite his preference for ethnographic/participant observation methods over rationalist game theory. I think he's does a great service here in carefully and clearly flagging for our attention the role "value-commitments" either implicitly (or preferably) self-consciously play in our intellectual attraction to one method or another. This raises in turn the question of how (and indeed if) such "value-commitments" can be themselves justified using one or another type of scholarly method/argument. I have long been puzzled/troubled over this issue and would be fascinated to hear more from Patrick to help me think more about it. He makes clear that he does not believe that empirical evidence can be brought to bear in this domain, but is there still a role for reason (of a non-instrumental form) in adjudicating such choices, or are we to interpret them ultimately as personal (or cultural) preferences. This is, on my reading, Web er's view and I'm wondering if Patrick follows Weber on this? [As an aside the latest issue of Political Research Quarterly has a great exposition by Jack Gunnell of Weber's views and the broader issues here about the ways in which scholars try to claim authority for their views]. Bill's follow-up on these issues makes clear that he believes there is a way to adjudicate ethical choice such that he can assert, with quiet confidence, the "moral superiority" of "interpretive methods." I must confess that this claim makes me profoundly uncomfortable! Why? First and foremost because it presupposes an answer to the philosophical puzzle posed above, and I'm as yet uncommitted on that. But also, a more tactical concern, is that my gut sense of the sociology of contemporary political science would be that claiming "moral superiority" is usually a sure fire way to anger rather than engage (let alone persuade) those of different methodological points of view, and is so because of a norm that holds such claims to be "beyond the bounds" of the kinds of arguments that can be legitimately deployed in meta-debates within the discipline. That norm is itself, I suspect, rooted in the essentially Weberian position that such claims are a matter of personal/cultural subje ctive choice [I'd be fascinated to see what you all think about where the norms of our discipline lie in this regard--I'd be happy to have my empirical hypothesis "falsified"!]. Third and finally, I suspect this is an issue on which "interpretivists" broadly conceived have firm disagreements. Hence pushing a claim to the "moral superiority" of interpretivism not only will not persuade non-"interpretivists" to revisit their beliefs, but also has the potential to fragment any incipient "interpretivist" movement. To be honest, I for one, would not be comfortable calling myself an "interpretivist" if my disciplinary colleagues associated this label with claims to "moral superiority" over them! But perhaps I'm in a tiny oddball minority on this... Cheers, Robert Adcock ----- Original Message ----- From: WJKELLPRO at aol.com Date: Saturday, February 28, 2009 5:25 pm Subject: [Interpretationandmethods] Game Theory To: D.Yanow at fsw.vu.nl, interpretationandmethods at listserv.cddc.vt.edu Cc: WJKELLPRO at aol.com > > () Hi Again! > Here?s my response to Patrick, Dvora, and Suzanne: > Get well soon, Patrick! > On an emotional level, I agree completely with my brother Patrick?s > contempt > for the hypocrisy of the game-playing game theorists. I think we are > very > close conceptually, too. > First, I like the poetry of the term ?monistic philosophical > ontology.? > Secondly, I agree 100% that social science begins with empathy. The > > positivists are deeply engaged in an appalling conceptual absurdity. > In their search > for ?objective knowledge,? they try to remove the observer from the > act of > observation. Good luck! > To me it seems obvious that humans observing human behavior is, first > of > all, a human-to-human relationship. Only because we are of the same > sort, can > we empathically understand one another. But empathy is not in itself > a > rational process. It is intuitive, mysterious, and thoroughly > personal. Out of > this intuitive process, which positivists pretend not to have, comes > > understanding. Understanding is the basis for verbalized > explanations. > There is also an ethical dimension embedded in the human-to-human > relationship upon which empathy rests. To understand another person > empathically > requires that you acknowledge their humanity. And that entails an > element of > respect; unless one is deliberately misanthropic, which may be the > case for some > positivists. > At this point, I disagree with my brother?s separation of epistemology > and > ethics. To know another person requires that you acknowledge his or > her > humanity, just as you are human. In this process of knowing, respect > is a natural > element. It must be dealt with, either by acknowledging it, or > denying it > like the positivists do. In short, good social science requires > clear > self-awareness. Of course, it also requires clear terminology, and > that is where > Dvora?s questions come in. > Dvora: do we have a better way of thinking about these than the old > dichotomous ones that claim that [we] are "only" interested in > understanding, not > 'explaining' or 'predicting'? I think I'm asking for a new definition > of what > it means to predict -- and I'm guessing that this would be a much > broader > understanding than the one based on experimentation and statistical > inference. > BILL: > These are very important problems. If we can resolve them within our > own > framework, we will have come a long way towards having a unified > system with > which to challenge the power elites. > For me the question is, what do these three terms ? understanding, > explanation, and prediction ? mean in the context of interpretive > social science. > Words don?t have abstract meanings, like satellites orbiting in > space, because > meaning is derived from the context involving a user?s intention and > a listener > ?s interpretation. The meanings the positivists give these words are > > designed to reinforce their interpretive framework. Therefore, I > reject their > meanings, and try to fashion meanings that will give more persuasive > coherence to > our theoretical point of view. > Prediction differs from the other two words because of its orientation > > towards the future. But it also has similarities. Of the three > terms, I think > that understanding entails both explanation and prediction. An > explanation is > a systematic exposition of a person?s understanding of a thing, > event, > concept, etc. Understanding itself can be pre-verbal, but > explanation must be > given in words. Prediction can be understood as a demonstration of > both > understanding and explanation. My present understanding, and > explanation, of ?A? > suggests that event ?B? will occur under X circumstances, at time T. > If it > all works-out, then my original understanding, and explanation based > on it, has > been, at least in some measure, confirmed, or validated. In other > words, I > can continue to hold my original understanding/explanation. > If there are conflicts between the actual event and my prediction, > then I > must re-adjust my understanding. This re-adjustment can entail a > slight > modification of my understanding, or a complete rejection of it, and > move me to > search for a new understanding. > In this way, the history of science can be interpreted as thoughtful > people > seeking a more satisfying understanding. This is their primary > motivation. > Explanation and prediction are secondary steps in the service of that > primary > motive. > Explanation and prediction need not assume a mechanistic theory of > causation. A prediction can be successful because the predictor > understands a > particular process well, and grasps its intentional trajectory. > Suppose I predict that about 30% of the eligible electorate will vote > in the > next congressional elections. If that happens, I sit back and say ?you > see, > I understand the intentional trajectory of the American voter.? But > if there > is a 50% turnout, or a 15% turnout, then my head starts spinning, and > I have > to get to work to try and make sense of the event. The problem for > me as a > political scientist is to find a satisfactory understanding of > events. When > I have that, I try to persuade others of my explanation, and they > accept it > or criticize it. Then we go back and forth until we reach a > consensus, or > agree to disagree. > On Fri, Feb 27, 2009 at 5:39 PM, <_psshea at csbs.utah.edu_ > () > wrote: > Suzanne Levi-Sanchez, > > "What can interpretive methods answer that game theory can't?" This > is a big question. > > In brief, game theory makes assumptions about motivations and about > how people "see" their world. So the game theorist posits that actors > are playing a particular game, chicken or some form of the prisoners' > dilemma. But how does the game theorist know that actors "see" the > game that he or she posits? > > In contrast, interpretive methodologies ask directly about human > meaning making rather than assuming how people see their worlds?. > BILL: > I agree. Game theory does not make the empathic effort to ?know? > what > actors are experiencing. Instead, these ?gamers? impose their > conception of > human nature upon the human behavior they purport to ?explain.? To > me, their > view is a shallow, myopic, unreal, and offensive distortion of me and > the > people I have known. I see interpretive methods as morally superior > to > human-denying positivistic methodologies. > I think that our moral superiority is our key advantage in winning > the fight > for academic prominence. > Bill Kelleher > > > > **************A Good Credit Score is 700 or Above. See yours in just 2 > easy > steps! > ( > %3D62%26bcd%3DfebemailfooterNO62) > _______________________________________________ > Interpretationandmethods mailing list > Interpretationandmethods at listserv.cddc.vt.edu > From psshea at csbs.utah.edu Sun Mar 1 13:56:52 2009 From: psshea at csbs.utah.edu (psshea at csbs.utah.edu) Date: Sun, 01 Mar 2009 11:56:52 -0700 Subject: [Interpretationandmethods] Interpretivism and ethics In-Reply-To: References: Message-ID: <20090301115652.l8x48qifi8k0kgoc@webmail.csbs.utah.edu> Robert, Thanks for raising this issue. Apologies to the list for giving another citation but I think it is relevant some of the issues you've raised: Schwartz-Shea, P. ?Conundrums in the Practice of Pluralism.? In Sanford Schram and Brian Caterino, eds., Making Political Science Matter: Debating Knowledge, Research, and Method. New York: NYU Press, 2006, 209-221. Specifically, I argue in my last paragraph: ... It is this third sort of pluralism that can, in the long run, produce a more honest and relevant social science?a social science that matters because it asks questions of justice about every facet of the research process. To be clear, I am not arguing that the answers to such questions are straight-forward. ***And facile judgments?that one set of research questions, methods, theories or approaches are automatically on side of justice whereas others serve only the powerful?must be vigorously resisted.*** Rather individual scholars and scholarly communities need to more consistently and persistently ask questions about who benefits from research and to theorize researchers? complex positioning in the political world. It is reflexivity on, rather than denial of, our politics that will make structural pluralism more productive of social science research that matters. Peri S-S Quoting Robert Adcock : > Dear all, > > This exchange has been fantastic! I want to single in on one key > issue that's come up in particular in the contributions by Patrick > and Bill. > > Patrick stressed that ethical choices/commitments underwrite his > preference for ethnographic/participant observation methods over > rationalist game theory. I think he's does a great service here in > carefully and clearly flagging for our attention the role > "value-commitments" either implicitly (or preferably) > self-consciously play in our intellectual attraction to one method > or another. This raises in turn the question of how (and indeed if) > such "value-commitments" can be themselves justified using one or > another type of scholarly method/argument. I have long been > puzzled/troubled over this issue and would be fascinated to hear > more from Patrick to help me think more about it. He makes clear > that he does not believe that empirical evidence can be brought to > bear in this domain, but is there still a role for reason (of a > non-instrumental form) in adjudicating such choices, or are we to > interpret them ultimately as personal (or cultural) preferences. > This is, on my reading, Web > er's view and I'm wondering if Patrick follows Weber on this? [As an > aside the latest issue of Political Research Quarterly has a great > exposition by Jack Gunnell of Weber's views and the broader issues > here about the ways in which scholars try to claim authority for > their views]. > > Bill's follow-up on these issues makes clear that he believes there > is a way to adjudicate ethical choice such that he can assert, with > quiet confidence, the "moral superiority" of "interpretive methods." > I must confess that this claim makes me profoundly uncomfortable! > Why? First and foremost because it presupposes an answer to the > philosophical puzzle posed above, and I'm as yet uncommitted on > that. But also, a more tactical concern, is that my gut sense of the > sociology of contemporary political science would be that claiming > "moral superiority" is usually a sure fire way to anger rather than > engage (let alone persuade) those of different methodological points > of view, and is so because of a norm that holds such claims to be > "beyond the bounds" of the kinds of arguments that can be > legitimately deployed in meta-debates within the discipline. That > norm is itself, I suspect, rooted in the essentially Weberian > position that such claims are a matter of personal/cultural subje > ctive choice [I'd be fascinated to see what you all think about > where the norms of our discipline lie in this regard--I'd be happy > to have my empirical hypothesis "falsified"!]. > > Third and finally, I suspect this is an issue on which > "interpretivists" broadly conceived have firm disagreements. Hence > pushing a claim to the "moral superiority" of interpretivism not > only will not persuade non-"interpretivists" to revisit their > beliefs, but also has the potential to fragment any incipient > "interpretivist" movement. To be honest, I for one, would not be > comfortable calling myself an "interpretivist" if my disciplinary > colleagues associated this label with claims to "moral superiority" > over them! But perhaps I'm in a tiny oddball minority on this... > > Cheers, > > Robert Adcock > > ----- Original Message ----- > From: WJKELLPRO at aol.com > Date: Saturday, February 28, 2009 5:25 pm > Subject: [Interpretationandmethods] Game Theory > To: D.Yanow at fsw.vu.nl, interpretationandmethods at listserv.cddc.vt.edu > Cc: WJKELLPRO at aol.com > >> >> () Hi Again! >> Here?s my response to Patrick, Dvora, and Suzanne: >> Get well soon, Patrick! >> On an emotional level, I agree completely with my brother Patrick?s >> contempt >> for the hypocrisy of the game-playing game theorists. I think we are >> very >> close conceptually, too. >> First, I like the poetry of the term ?monistic philosophical >> ontology.? >> Secondly, I agree 100% that social science begins with empathy. The >> >> positivists are deeply engaged in an appalling conceptual absurdity. >> In their search >> for ?objective knowledge,? they try to remove the observer from the >> act of >> observation. Good luck! >> To me it seems obvious that humans observing human behavior is, first >> of >> all, a human-to-human relationship. Only because we are of the same >> sort, can >> we empathically understand one another. But empathy is not in itself >> a >> rational process. It is intuitive, mysterious, and thoroughly >> personal. Out of >> this intuitive process, which positivists pretend not to have, comes >> >> understanding. Understanding is the basis for verbalized >> explanations. >> There is also an ethical dimension embedded in the human-to-human >> relationship upon which empathy rests. To understand another person >> empathically >> requires that you acknowledge their humanity. And that entails an >> element of >> respect; unless one is deliberately misanthropic, which may be the >> case for some >> positivists. >> At this point, I disagree with my brother?s separation of epistemology >> and >> ethics. To know another person requires that you acknowledge his or >> her >> humanity, just as you are human. In this process of knowing, respect >> is a natural >> element. It must be dealt with, either by acknowledging it, or >> denying it >> like the positivists do. In short, good social science requires >> clear >> self-awareness. Of course, it also requires clear terminology, and >> that is where >> Dvora?s questions come in. >> Dvora: do we have a better way of thinking about these than the old >> dichotomous ones that claim that [we] are "only" interested in >> understanding, not >> 'explaining' or 'predicting'? I think I'm asking for a new definition >> of what >> it means to predict -- and I'm guessing that this would be a much >> broader >> understanding than the one based on experimentation and statistical >> inference. >> BILL: >> These are very important problems. If we can resolve them within our >> own >> framework, we will have come a long way towards having a unified >> system with >> which to challenge the power elites. >> For me the question is, what do these three terms ? understanding, >> explanation, and prediction ? mean in the context of interpretive >> social science. >> Words don?t have abstract meanings, like satellites orbiting in >> space, because >> meaning is derived from the context involving a user?s intention and >> a listener >> ?s interpretation. The meanings the positivists give these words are >> >> designed to reinforce their interpretive framework. Therefore, I >> reject their >> meanings, and try to fashion meanings that will give more persuasive >> coherence to >> our theoretical point of view. >> Prediction differs from the other two words because of its orientation >> >> towards the future. But it also has similarities. Of the three >> terms, I think >> that understanding entails both explanation and prediction. An >> explanation is >> a systematic exposition of a person?s understanding of a thing, >> event, >> concept, etc. Understanding itself can be pre-verbal, but >> explanation must be >> given in words. Prediction can be understood as a demonstration of >> both >> understanding and explanation. My present understanding, and >> explanation, of ?A? >> suggests that event ?B? will occur under X circumstances, at time T. >> If it >> all works-out, then my original understanding, and explanation based >> on it, has >> been, at least in some measure, confirmed, or validated. In other >> words, I >> can continue to hold my original understanding/explanation. >> If there are conflicts between the actual event and my prediction, >> then I >> must re-adjust my understanding. This re-adjustment can entail a >> slight >> modification of my understanding, or a complete rejection of it, and >> move me to >> search for a new understanding. >> In this way, the history of science can be interpreted as thoughtful >> people >> seeking a more satisfying understanding. This is their primary >> motivation. >> Explanation and prediction are secondary steps in the service of that >> primary >> motive. >> Explanation and prediction need not assume a mechanistic theory of >> causation. A prediction can be successful because the predictor >> understands a >> particular process well, and grasps its intentional trajectory. >> Suppose I predict that about 30% of the eligible electorate will vote >> in the >> next congressional elections. If that happens, I sit back and say ?you >> see, >> I understand the intentional trajectory of the American voter.? But >> if there >> is a 50% turnout, or a 15% turnout, then my head starts spinning, and >> I have >> to get to work to try and make sense of the event. The problem for >> me as a >> political scientist is to find a satisfactory understanding of >> events. When >> I have that, I try to persuade others of my explanation, and they >> accept it >> or criticize it. Then we go back and forth until we reach a >> consensus, or >> agree to disagree. >> On Fri, Feb 27, 2009 at 5:39 PM, <_psshea at csbs.utah.edu_ >> () > wrote: >> Suzanne Levi-Sanchez, >> >> "What can interpretive methods answer that game theory can't?" This >> is a big question. >> >> In brief, game theory makes assumptions about motivations and about >> how people "see" their world. So the game theorist posits that actors >> are playing a particular game, chicken or some form of the prisoners' >> dilemma. But how does the game theorist know that actors "see" the >> game that he or she posits? >> >> In contrast, interpretive methodologies ask directly about human >> meaning making rather than assuming how people see their worlds?. >> BILL: >> I agree. Game theory does not make the empathic effort to ?know? >> what >> actors are experiencing. Instead, these ?gamers? impose their >> conception of >> human nature upon the human behavior they purport to ?explain.? To >> me, their >> view is a shallow, myopic, unreal, and offensive distortion of me and >> the >> people I have known. I see interpretive methods as morally superior >> to >> human-denying positivistic methodologies. >> I think that our moral superiority is our key advantage in winning >> the fight >> for academic prominence. >> Bill Kelleher >> >> >> >> **************A Good Credit Score is 700 or Above. See yours in just 2 >> easy >> steps! >> ( >> %3D62%26bcd%3DfebemailfooterNO62) >> _______________________________________________ >> Interpretationandmethods mailing list >> Interpretationandmethods at listserv.cddc.vt.edu >> > _______________________________________________ > Interpretationandmethods mailing list > Interpretationandmethods at listserv.cddc.vt.edu > http://listserv.cddc.vt.edu/mailman/listinfo/interpretationandmethods > > -- Peregrine Schwartz-Shea Professor University of Utah Political Science Department 260 South Central Campus Drive Rm 252 Salt Lake City, UT 84112-9152 (801) 581-6300 phone mail psshea at poli-sci.utah.edu From sule.sanchez at gmail.com Sun Mar 1 14:03:09 2009 From: sule.sanchez at gmail.com (Suzanne Levi-Sanchez) Date: Sun, 1 Mar 2009 14:03:09 -0500 Subject: [Interpretationandmethods] game theory In-Reply-To: References: <20090227153941.iz2ea17xbc4o8okg@webmail.csbs.utah.edu> Message-ID: Hi All, I'm reading through all the responses, digesting them, and will likely have many more questions/comments but.. just to clarify -- at Rutgers, while there does seem to be a turn toward rat choice, there are several wonderful professors including Jan Kubik in particular, who are very much engaging the philosophy of science in class discussion. But, on the other hand, the legitimacy in the poli-sci of game theory both for status and more importantly, for funding, is real. What Patrick said about choosing toilet paper as an indicator of freedom is particularly pertinent. Just because it may seem to be logically coherent doesn't mean that it is useful. Is life logically coherent? In terms of predictive capability -- are theatre, art and literature better predictors because they are better guages of what a particular group of people is thinking at a particular time than a mathematical model which has to make all sort of assumptions about what they think and as Patrick pointed out, constraining agency to such a degree that the model actual becomes micro-structuralism? Dvora's chessboard analogy supports a PTJ's micro-structuralism idea with the board being the structure while in interpretive methodologies the rules of the game are a bunch of maleable players, switching roles and playing on ever-shifting sands and waters of the places in which those players can engage or the power they control: In the former [game theory], we explore how people behave on this chessboard, stipulating that all chessboards are alike in their rules of engagement, including the size of the board, and you can't play off the edges of the board; in the latter, we stipulate neither the design or size of the board nor the rules of play -- beyond the assumption that all humans are meaning-making creatures, and that their language/acts/physical objects are ways in which they express and communicate those meanings." Additionally, I think my basic knee-jerk reaction toward game-theory is very much the same as Dvora's issue when she says, "I suppose if I shared game theorists' assumptions about the rational/economic man [sic], I would be less bothered by that approach. But, as you say, they are not 'testing' their own assumptions." Patrick says, "The one place where I think that such an analysis has merit is in a relatively closed interaction-system characterized by limited signaling and effectively fixed actors, environments, and rules -- like driving on the highway. But most of social life doesn't look like that to me, and ethically speaking I would strenuously resist the effort to make social life like that by presuming that it already is and building models on that basis." I do wonder, however, if the mathematical modelling approach, in particular applied with the goal of understanding how an interpretation might play out in a logical form after the ethnographic and interpretive work is complete, an interesting proposition but my math skills will likely never get me there! The main use for this would be to begin to understand, through many such models, if indeed there is any logical overlap in messy chessboards made of sand and water with players made of silly putty. In some ways, this is what Margaret Levi tried to do, as Patrick pointed out, " Alternatively, one could do what Margaret Levi et. al. did in the book _Analytical Narratives_, where they tried to construct rationalist game-theoretical accounts of historical events; to their surprise, but not to mine, they discovered that the game formalizations had all of these "off-the-path equilibria" (stable solutions that weren't realized historically) and they had to use the narrative and the historical facts to explain why those other equilibria did not occur. But that's precisely what one does with an ideal-type: lay it down on empirics in order to highlight the distinctive and unusual aspects of the case, and to explain why what we might have expected based purely on the formalization did not in fact occur. And since I think rationalist game theory is an ideal-type interpretive lens, this makes perfect sense to me, methodologically speaking." The diference between Levi's approach and what I am suggesting, is that the first part of the work needs to be the interpretive, ethnographic, historical anlaysis and then the model would be derived from that work. The caveat is that it would have to be done on dozens of cases of similar approaches to either falsify the ability for the model to translate whatsoever or prove that a mathematical model of a messy interpretive approach could hold water across vastly different cases. In the end, this research experiment (perhaps it has already been done?) may prove what Patrick is arguing in that, " we ought to ditch prediction as a feasible goal for any science, social or otherwise, and toss out the outmoded "covering-law" model of explanation/prediction that it is linked to. Instead, we ought to focus on generating explanations in terms of causal mechanisms, processes, and configurations -- more contingent, and inherently unpredictable, but more likely to tell us something worth knowing." This leads me to Dvora's comment: " I think I'm asking for a new definition of what it means to predict -- and I'm guessing that this would be a much broader understanding than the one based on experimentation and statistical inference." This is precisely what I have been grappling with. The problem, at least in my own work, is that it becomes so sprawling that nobody understands it and often, after I complete the research, write it, in sort of zen coherence daze, even I have a hard time undestanding it. I am working on doing less but still being true to my questions. Hopefully, I will get better at it! Thank you all again! I am so grateful for this forum. Best, Susi Here's where the issue gets sociological, since the local culture at > Rutgers (like in most other places in the US) steers students towards > rationalist game theory. My advice: challenge whomever gives you that advice > to justify her or his preference for rationalist game theory in terms that > don't presume the superiority of rationalist game theory (like mathematical > formalization). I'll bet that they can't do it, unless you're talking to > someone like Jim Johnson at Rochester -- who is that rare bird among > rationalists who actually knows and cares about the underlying philosophy of > science issues that are implicated here. > > And just to end on a note of praise for Peri: in some of her work she's > quite convincingly shown the narrowness of methodological education among > political scientists in the US, especially the virtually complete absence > of philosophy of science in our curriculums. More attention to these > fundamental conceptual issues might open more space for an honest discussion > of the strengths and weaknesses of different methodological approaches. But > in my experience, whenever I try to steer the discussion onto these grounds, > people's eyes glaze over, and I suspect that this is because of > graduate-school socialization and its reinforcement through the standard > career path of political scientists in the US: there's little or no basic > knowledge about these ontological issues and their epistemic consequences > provided in graduate school, and there's little or no opportunity or > encouragement to develop those competencies after getting a PhD. The whole > philosophy of science debate in International Relations, for example, > basically involves a dozen people, and half of them are pushing a strange > (and in most cases internally incoherent) amalgam of Vienna Circle logical > positivism, Popperian falsification, and quasi-Lakatosian notions about > research programmes. If more people knew about and talked about these > issues, maybe we wouldn't end up in these bizarre impasses where we can't > have a serious discussion about diverse methodologies because, quite > frankly, most of the potential participants don't have enough basic > knowledge of the issues and the literature to engage in the discussion in > the first place. > > Okay -- end of sermon. > > PTJ > > PS I would also say that there's a difference between rationalist game > theory and the more evolutionary/complexity style of analysis when it comes > to the coherence between value-orientations and empirical execution, > although most people who use evolutionary game theory are similarly confused > about the epistemic status of their models. But that's another post, or > maybe a book chapter :-) > > On Feb 27, 2009, at 11:08 PM, Suzanne Levi-Sanchez wrote: > > Dear Professor Schwartz-Shea, > > Thank you!!! I will read the articles. You have written largely what I > have tried to argue but not as coherently as you did below! In essence, > game theory attempts to clarify intentions while game theory attempts to > clarify competing preferences and assumes knowledge of intentions? > > Again, thank you for taking the time to respond to my rather obnoxiously > large question. > > Kindest of Regards, > Susi > > On Fri, Feb 27, 2009 at 5:39 PM, wrote: > >> Suzanne Levi-Sanchez, >> >> "What can interpretive methods answer that game theory can't?" This >> is a big question. >> >> In brief, game theory makes assumptions about motivations and about >> how people "see" their world. So the game theorist posits that actors >> are playing a particular game, chicken or some form of the prisoners' >> dilemma. But how does the game theorist know that actors "see" the >> game that he or she posits? >> >> In contrast, interpretive methodologies ask directly about human >> meaning making rather than assuming how people see their worlds. I >> used to do game-theoretic experiments but all my published results >> ended up showing the ways in which game theory was not particularly >> useful! >> >> So, see, e.g., >> >> ?Egoism, Universalism and Parochialism: Experimental Evidence from the >> Layered Prisoners' Dilemma,? with Randy Simmons, Rationality and >> Society, 1991, 3 (1), 106-132. >> >> And my last piece using game theory: >> ?Theorizing Gender for Experimental, Game Theory: Experiments with >> 'Sex Status' and 'Merit Status' in an Asymmetric Game,? Sex Roles, >> 2002, 47, (7/8), 301-319. >> >> Peri S-S >> >> >> -- >> Peregrine Schwartz-Shea >> Professor >> >> University of Utah >> Political Science Department >> 260 South Central Campus Drive Rm 252 >> Salt Lake City, UT 84112-9152 >> >> (801) 581-6300 phone mail >> psshea at poli-sci.utah.edu >> >> >> >> _______________________________________________ >> Interpretationandmethods mailing list >> Interpretationandmethods at listserv.cddc.vt.edu >> http://listserv.cddc.vt.edu/mailman/listinfo/interpretationandmethods >> > > _______________________________________________ > Interpretationandmethods mailing list > Interpretationandmethods at listserv.cddc.vt.edu > http://listserv.cddc.vt.edu/mailman/listinfo/interpretationandmethods > > > === > Patrick Thaddeus Jackson > Director of General Education, American University > Editor-in-Chief, Journal of International Relations and Development > http://profptj.blogspot.com | http://www.kittenboo.com > calendar: http://ical.mac.com/onyxdr/Patrick > > > _______________________________________________ > Interpretationandmethods mailing list > Interpretationandmethods at listserv.cddc.vt.edu > http://listserv.cddc.vt.edu/mailman/listinfo/interpretationandmethods > > -------------- next part -------------- An HTML attachment was scrubbed... URL: http://listserv.cddc.vt.edu/pipermail/interpretationandmethods/attachments/20090301/ff7967a3/attachment.html From sschram at brynmawr.edu Sun Mar 1 15:50:55 2009 From: sschram at brynmawr.edu (Sanford Schram) Date: Sun, 1 Mar 2009 15:50:55 -0500 (EST) Subject: [Interpretationandmethods] Interpretivism and ethics In-Reply-To: <1482774289.833071235939843862.JavaMail.root@ganesh.brynmawr.edu> Message-ID: <304907822.834761235940655532.JavaMail.root@ganesh.brynmawr.edu> Great discussion. I have just three small points: (1) the Jack Gunnell article Robert Adcock mentions is something I think everyone should read, he explicitly ties Weber and Oakschott to the perestroika debate; (2) I venture to say that Patrick does not follow Gunnell on Weber :) as we have hashed out on the perestroika list a few years back; and (3) rational choice models, including game theoretic models, make a lot of sense in highly constrained decision systems where participants have almost no choice but to all think like they drank the kool-aid of utility maximization (however defined by that context. On the last point, take the example of welfare-to-work case managers who work under enormous pressure to meet personal statistical benchmarks of the performance management system that their agency and the state government have implemented to track the movement of recipients off the rolls and into jobs. Many of these case workers are single mother former recipients themselves who are torn about taking a cutthroat, bottom-line "business model" approach to working with their clients (now often called "candidates," as in job candidates). Regardless of their access to local knowledge and alternative understandings of the lives of welfare recipients, these case managers (who themselves are now sometimes referred to as "career counselors") have no choice but to follow the logic of the system and punish recipients with financial penalties if they make missteps in fulfilling the conditions of their welfare-to-work contracts. The contract agency's own funding is contingent upon withholding funding from recipients who are not compliant. Case managers must enforce discipline on their clients by reducing their benefits where required or they themselves could see reductions in their pay. The Florida welfare-to-work system is an excellent example of this system. In this scenario, case managers end up often making "rational" choices about who to penalize that are rational only under the performance management system in which they operate and not always rational to them personally. That is why a number the case managers cry during in-depth interviewing about how they feel uncomfortable working in such a system. Others are less troubled, but express ambivalence nonetheless. Others go to great lengths to rationalize their extensive reliance on sanctioning to enforce discipline on their clients. Rationality is always context specific and the context needs to be explicated if we are ever to understand what is rational in any situation, social setting, agency environment, etc. Understanding the context for what is rational is surely an interpretive act implicit in all rational models. But once explicated, the models have great utility in the appropriate context. Mixed-methods research helps to employ statistical models while accounting for context. My forthcoming co-authored study on welfare reform, with Joe Soss and Richard Fording, hopes to illustrate this. ----- Original Message ----- From: psshea at csbs.utah.edu To: interpretationandmethods at listserv.cddc.vt.edu Sent: Sunday, March 1, 2009 1:56:52 PM GMT -05:00 US/Canada Eastern Subject: Re: [Interpretationandmethods] Interpretivism and ethics Robert, Thanks for raising this issue. Apologies to the list for giving another citation but I think it is relevant some of the issues you've raised: Schwartz-Shea, P. ?Conundrums in the Practice of Pluralism.? In Sanford Schram and Brian Caterino, eds., Making Political Science Matter: Debating Knowledge, Research, and Method. New York: NYU Press, 2006, 209-221. Specifically, I argue in my last paragraph: ... It is this third sort of pluralism that can, in the long run, produce a more honest and relevant social science?a social science that matters because it asks questions of justice about every facet of the research process. To be clear, I am not arguing that the answers to such questions are straight-forward. ***And facile judgments?that one set of research questions, methods, theories or approaches are automatically on side of justice whereas others serve only the powerful?must be vigorously resisted.*** Rather individual scholars and scholarly communities need to more consistently and persistently ask questions about who benefits from research and to theorize researchers? complex positioning in the political world. It is reflexivity on, rather than denial of, our politics that will make structural pluralism more productive of social science research that matters. Peri S-S Quoting Robert Adcock : > Dear all, > > This exchange has been fantastic! I want to single in on one key > issue that's come up in particular in the contributions by Patrick > and Bill. > > Patrick stressed that ethical choices/commitments underwrite his > preference for ethnographic/participant observation methods over > rationalist game theory. I think he's does a great service here in > carefully and clearly flagging for our attention the role > "value-commitments" either implicitly (or preferably) > self-consciously play in our intellectual attraction to one method > or another. This raises in turn the question of how (and indeed if) > such "value-commitments" can be themselves justified using one or > another type of scholarly method/argument. I have long been > puzzled/troubled over this issue and would be fascinated to hear > more from Patrick to help me think more about it. He makes clear > that he does not believe that empirical evidence can be brought to > bear in this domain, but is there still a role for reason (of a > non-instrumental form) in adjudicating such choices, or are we to > interpret them ultimately as personal (or cultural) preferences. > This is, on my reading, Web > er's view and I'm wondering if Patrick follows Weber on this? [As an > aside the latest issue of Political Research Quarterly has a great > exposition by Jack Gunnell of Weber's views and the broader issues > here about the ways in which scholars try to claim authority for > their views]. > > Bill's follow-up on these issues makes clear that he believes there > is a way to adjudicate ethical choice such that he can assert, with > quiet confidence, the "moral superiority" of "interpretive methods." > I must confess that this claim makes me profoundly uncomfortable! > Why? First and foremost because it presupposes an answer to the > philosophical puzzle posed above, and I'm as yet uncommitted on > that. But also, a more tactical concern, is that my gut sense of the > sociology of contemporary political science would be that claiming > "moral superiority" is usually a sure fire way to anger rather than > engage (let alone persuade) those of different methodological points > of view, and is so because of a norm that holds such claims to be > "beyond the bounds" of the kinds of arguments that can be > legitimately deployed in meta-debates within the discipline. That > norm is itself, I suspect, rooted in the essentially Weberian > position that such claims are a matter of personal/cultural subje > ctive choice [I'd be fascinated to see what you all think about > where the norms of our discipline lie in this regard--I'd be happy > to have my empirical hypothesis "falsified"!]. > > Third and finally, I suspect this is an issue on which > "interpretivists" broadly conceived have firm disagreements. Hence > pushing a claim to the "moral superiority" of interpretivism not > only will not persuade non-"interpretivists" to revisit their > beliefs, but also has the potential to fragment any incipient > "interpretivist" movement. To be honest, I for one, would not be > comfortable calling myself an "interpretivist" if my disciplinary > colleagues associated this label with claims to "moral superiority" > over them! But perhaps I'm in a tiny oddball minority on this... > > Cheers, > > Robert Adcock > > ----- Original Message ----- > From: WJKELLPRO at aol.com > Date: Saturday, February 28, 2009 5:25 pm > Subject: [Interpretationandmethods] Game Theory > To: D.Yanow at fsw.vu.nl, interpretationandmethods at listserv.cddc.vt.edu > Cc: WJKELLPRO at aol.com > >> >> () Hi Again! >> Here?s my response to Patrick, Dvora, and Suzanne: >> Get well soon, Patrick! >> On an emotional level, I agree completely with my brother Patrick?s >> contempt >> for the hypocrisy of the game-playing game theorists. I think we are >> very >> close conceptually, too. >> First, I like the poetry of the term ?monistic philosophical >> ontology.? >> Secondly, I agree 100% that social science begins with empathy. The >> >> positivists are deeply engaged in an appalling conceptual absurdity. >> In their search >> for ?objective knowledge,? they try to remove the observer from the >> act of >> observation. Good luck! >> To me it seems obvious that humans observing human behavior is, first >> of >> all, a human-to-human relationship. Only because we are of the same >> sort, can >> we empathically understand one another. But empathy is not in itself >> a >> rational process. It is intuitive, mysterious, and thoroughly >> personal. Out of >> this intuitive process, which positivists pretend not to have, comes >> >> understanding. Understanding is the basis for verbalized >> explanations. >> There is also an ethical dimension embedded in the human-to-human >> relationship upon which empathy rests. To understand another person >> empathically >> requires that you acknowledge their humanity. And that entails an >> element of >> respect; unless one is deliberately misanthropic, which may be the >> case for some >> positivists. >> At this point, I disagree with my brother?s separation of epistemology >> and >> ethics. To know another person requires that you acknowledge his or >> her >> humanity, just as you are human. In this process of knowing, respect >> is a natural >> element. It must be dealt with, either by acknowledging it, or >> denying it >> like the positivists do. In short, good social science requires >> clear >> self-awareness. Of course, it also requires clear terminology, and >> that is where >> Dvora?s questions come in. >> Dvora: do we have a better way of thinking about these than the old >> dichotomous ones that claim that [we] are "only" interested in >> understanding, not >> 'explaining' or 'predicting'? I think I'm asking for a new definition >> of what >> it means to predict -- and I'm guessing that this would be a much >> broader >> understanding than the one based on experimentation and statistical >> inference. >> BILL: >> These are very important problems. If we can resolve them within our >> own >> framework, we will have come a long way towards having a unified >> system with >> which to challenge the power elites. >> For me the question is, what do these three terms ? understanding, >> explanation, and prediction ? mean in the context of interpretive >> social science. >> Words don?t have abstract meanings, like satellites orbiting in >> space, because >> meaning is derived from the context involving a user?s intention and >> a listener >> ?s interpretation. The meanings the positivists give these words are >> >> designed to reinforce their interpretive framework. Therefore, I >> reject their >> meanings, and try to fashion meanings that will give more persuasive >> coherence to >> our theoretical point of view. >> Prediction differs from the other two words because of its orientation >> >> towards the future. But it also has similarities. Of the three >> terms, I think >> that understanding entails both explanation and prediction. An >> explanation is >> a systematic exposition of a person?s understanding of a thing, >> event, >> concept, etc. Understanding itself can be pre-verbal, but >> explanation must be >> given in words. Prediction can be understood as a demonstration of >> both >> understanding and explanation. My present understanding, and >> explanation, of ?A? >> suggests that event ?B? will occur under X circumstances, at time T. >> If it >> all works-out, then my original understanding, and explanation based >> on it, has >> been, at least in some measure, confirmed, or validated. In other >> words, I >> can continue to hold my original understanding/explanation. >> If there are conflicts between the actual event and my prediction, >> then I >> must re-adjust my understanding. This re-adjustment can entail a >> slight >> modification of my understanding, or a complete rejection of it, and >> move me to >> search for a new understanding. >> In this way, the history of science can be interpreted as thoughtful >> people >> seeking a more satisfying understanding. This is their primary >> motivation. >> Explanation and prediction are secondary steps in the service of that >> primary >> motive. >> Explanation and prediction need not assume a mechanistic theory of >> causation. A prediction can be successful because the predictor >> understands a >> particular process well, and grasps its intentional trajectory. >> Suppose I predict that about 30% of the eligible electorate will vote >> in the >> next congressional elections. If that happens, I sit back and say ?you >> see, >> I understand the intentional trajectory of the American voter.? But >> if there >> is a 50% turnout, or a 15% turnout, then my head starts spinning, and >> I have >> to get to work to try and make sense of the event. The problem for >> me as a >> political scientist is to find a satisfactory understanding of >> events. When >> I have that, I try to persuade others of my explanation, and they >> accept it >> or criticize it. Then we go back and forth until we reach a >> consensus, or >> agree to disagree. >> On Fri, Feb 27, 2009 at 5:39 PM, <_psshea at csbs.utah.edu_ >> () > wrote: >> Suzanne Levi-Sanchez, >> >> "What can interpretive methods answer that game theory can't?" This >> is a big question. >> >> In brief, game theory makes assumptions about motivations and about >> how people "see" their world. So the game theorist posits that actors >> are playing a particular game, chicken or some form of the prisoners' >> dilemma. But how does the game theorist know that actors "see" the >> game that he or she posits? >> >> In contrast, interpretive methodologies ask directly about human >> meaning making rather than assuming how people see their worlds?. >> BILL: >> I agree. Game theory does not make the empathic effort to ?know? >> what >> actors are experiencing. Instead, these ?gamers? impose their >> conception of >> human nature upon the human behavior they purport to ?explain.? To >> me, their >> view is a shallow, myopic, unreal, and offensive distortion of me and >> the >> people I have known. I see interpretive methods as morally superior >> to >> human-denying positivistic methodologies. >> I think that our moral superiority is our key advantage in winning >> the fight >> for academic prominence. >> Bill Kelleher >> >> >> >> **************A Good Credit Score is 700 or Above. See yours in just 2 >> easy >> steps! >> ( >> %3D62%26bcd%3DfebemailfooterNO62) >> _______________________________________________ >> Interpretationandmethods mailing list >> Interpretationandmethods at listserv.cddc.vt.edu >> > _______________________________________________ > Interpretationandmethods mailing list > Interpretationandmethods at listserv.cddc.vt.edu > http://listserv.cddc.vt.edu/mailman/listinfo/interpretationandmethods > > -- Peregrine Schwartz-Shea Professor University of Utah Political Science Department 260 South Central Campus Drive Rm 252 Salt Lake City, UT 84112-9152 (801) 581-6300 phone mail psshea at poli-sci.utah.edu _______________________________________________ Interpretationandmethods mailing list Interpretationandmethods at listserv.cddc.vt.edu http://listserv.cddc.vt.edu/mailman/listinfo/interpretationandmethods From D.Yanow at fsw.vu.nl Sun Mar 1 16:10:48 2009 From: D.Yanow at fsw.vu.nl (Dvora Yanow) Date: Sun, 1 Mar 2009 22:10:48 +0100 Subject: [Interpretationandmethods] Interpretivism and ethics References: <304907822.834761235940655532.JavaMail.root@ganesh.brynmawr.edu> Message-ID: <5286BEEC21FADA47A24AA92D8BC9270E028A3993@fswmail01.scw.vu.nl> An HTML attachment was scrubbed... URL: http://listserv.cddc.vt.edu/pipermail/interpretationandmethods/attachments/20090301/e9fa74a6/attachment.html From sschram at brynmawr.edu Sun Mar 1 16:57:42 2009 From: sschram at brynmawr.edu (Sanford Schram) Date: Sun, 1 Mar 2009 16:57:42 -0500 (EST) Subject: [Interpretationandmethods] Interpretivism and ethics In-Reply-To: <1872361273.848471235944657077.JavaMail.root@ganesh.brynmawr.edu> Message-ID: <774564773.848491235944662505.JavaMail.root@ganesh.brynmawr.edu> Much of what we report on from our project is available at: http://www.uky.edu/~rford/Home_files/page0001.htm The articles from our project that focus on this dimension of welfare reform include: Schram, Sanford F., Joe Soss, Richard C. Fording and Linda Houser. 2009. "Deciding to Discipline: Race, Choice, and Punishment at the Frontlines of Welfare Reform." American Sociological Review, 74. 3 (June): forthcoming. Soss, Joe, Richard C. Fording, and Sanford F. Schram. n.d. "The Organization of Discipline: From Performance Management to Perversity and Punishment." Journal of Public Administration Research and Theory (under review). Schram, Sanford F., Richard Fording, and Joe Soss. 2008. "Neoliberal Poverty Governance: Race, Place and the Punitive Turn in U.S. Welfare Policy." Cambridge Journal of Regions, Economy and Society 1, 1 (April 2008): 17-36. Schram, Sanford F., Joe Soss, and Richard Fording. n.d. "The Third Level of U.S. Welfare Reform: Neoliberal Pedagogy." Citizenship Studies (under review). The book is to be written yet but under contract: Joe Soss, Richard C. Fording and Sanford F. Schram, Deciding to Discipline: Neoliberal Paternalism and the Persistent Power of Race (University of Chicago Press) ----- Original Message ----- From: "Dvora Yanow" To: "interpretation and methods group" Sent: Sunday, March 1, 2009 4:10:48 PM GMT -05:00 US/Canada Eastern Subject: Re: [Interpretationandmethods] Interpretivism and ethics RE: [Interpretationandmethods] Interpretivism and ethics Thanks for this, Sandy. Do you already have pub data for the forthcoming article? If so, can you please post it? or let us know where to look, and about when? And: "and not always rational to them personally." -- isn't this the underside of the enforced narrowing and attributional apparatuses of various games? Oh, oh -- I wasn't going to go here, because I hold with Robert on not claiming to be 'closer to God' or that someone else's method is 'morally' inferior, but it suddenly strikes me that this sort of unspoken claim is exactly what so enfuriates me about such theorizing: who/what gives someone the moral right to claim that all humans behave in X way (and if they don't, they are somehow inferior human beings)? But having fallen into that line of thinking, I want to point that same gun at myself: what gives me the moral right to claim that all humans are meaning-making (and therefore that social science should investigate those processes and specific meanings)? Uh, but somehow, it's not, or doesn't feel like, the same thing. Why? Thanks, Dvora, who is appalled by the language of candidates and counselors!!! -----Original Message----- From: interpretationandmethods-bounces at malagigi.cddc.vt.edu on behalf of Sanford Schram Sent: Sun 01-Mar-09 21:50 To: interpretation and methods group Subject: Re: [Interpretationandmethods] Interpretivism and ethics Great discussion. I have just three small points: (1) the Jack Gunnell article Robert Adcock mentions is something I think everyone should read, he explicitly ties Weber and Oakschott to the perestroika debate; (2) I venture to say that Patrick does not follow Gunnell on Weber :) as we have hashed out on the perestroika list a few years back; and (3) rational choice models, including game theoretic models, make a lot of sense in highly constrained decision systems where participants have almost no choice but to all think like they drank the kool-aid of utility maximization (however defined by that context. On the last point, take the example of welfare-to-work case managers who work under enormous pressure to meet personal statistical benchmarks of the performance management system that their agency and the state government have implemented to track the movement of recipients off the rolls and into jobs. Many of these case workers are single mother former recipients themselves who are torn about taking a cutthroat, bottom-line "business model" approach to working with their clients (now often called "candidates," as in job candidates). Regardless of their access to local knowledge and alternative understandings of the lives of welfare recipients, these case managers (who themselves are now sometimes referred to as "career counselors") have no choice but to follow the logic of the system and punish recipients with financial penalties if they make missteps in fulfilling the conditions of their welfare-to-work contracts. The contract agency's own funding is contingent upon withholding funding from recipients who are not compliant. Case managers must enforce discipline on their clients by reducing their benefits where required or they themselves could see reductions in their pay. The Florida welfare-to-work system is an excellent example of this system. In this scenario, case managers end up often making "rational" choices about who to penalize that are rational only under the performance management system in which they operate and not always rational to them personally. That is why a number the case managers cry during in-depth interviewing about how they feel uncomfortable working in such a system. Others are less troubled, but express ambivalence nonetheless. Others go to great lengths to rationalize their extensive reliance on sanctioning to enforce discipline on their clients. Rationality is always context specific and the context needs to be explicated if we are ever to understand what is rational in any situation, social setting, agency environment, etc. Understanding the context for what is rational is surely an interpretive act implicit in all rational models. But once explicated, the models have great utility in the appropriate context. Mixed-methods research helps to employ statistical models while accounting for context. My forthcoming co-authored study on welfare reform, with Joe Soss and Richard Fording, hopes to illustrate this. ----- Original Message ----- From: psshea at csbs.utah.edu To: interpretationandmethods at listserv.cddc.vt.edu Sent: Sunday, March 1, 2009 1:56:52 PM GMT -05:00 US/Canada Eastern Subject: Re: [Interpretationandmethods] Interpretivism and ethics Robert, Thanks for raising this issue. Apologies to the list for giving another citation but I think it is relevant some of the issues you've raised: Schwartz-Shea, P. "Conundrums in the Practice of Pluralism." In Sanford Schram and Brian Caterino, eds., Making Political Science Matter: Debating Knowledge, Research, and Method. New York: NYU Press, 2006, 209-221. Specifically, I argue in my last paragraph: ... It is this third sort of pluralism that can, in the long run, produce a more honest and relevant social science-a social science that matters because it asks questions of justice about every facet of the research process. To be clear, I am not arguing that the answers to such questions are straight-forward. ***And facile judgments-that one set of research questions, methods, theories or approaches are automatically on side of justice whereas others serve only the powerful-must be vigorously resisted.*** Rather individual scholars and scholarly communities need to more consistently and persistently ask questions about who benefits from research and to theorize researchers' complex positioning in the political world. It is reflexivity on, rather than denial of, our politics that will make structural pluralism more productive of social science research that matters. Peri S-S Quoting Robert Adcock : > Dear all, > > This exchange has been fantastic! I want to single in on one key > issue that's come up in particular in the contributions by Patrick > and Bill. > > Patrick stressed that ethical choices/commitments underwrite his > preference for ethnographic/participant observation methods over > rationalist game theory. I think he's does a great service here in > carefully and clearly flagging for our attention the role > "value-commitments" either implicitly (or preferably) > self-consciously play in our intellectual attraction to one method > or another. This raises in turn the question of how (and indeed if) > such "value-commitments" can be themselves justified using one or > another type of scholarly method/argument. I have long been > puzzled/troubled over this issue and would be fascinated to hear > more from Patrick to help me think more about it. He makes clear > that he does not believe that empirical evidence can be brought to > bear in this domain, but is there still a role for reason (of a > non-instrumental form) in adjudicating such choices, or are we to > interpret them ultimately as personal (or cultural) preferences. > This is, on my reading, Web > er's view and I'm wondering if Patrick follows Weber on this? [As an > aside the latest issue of Political Research Quarterly has a great > exposition by Jack Gunnell of Weber's views and the broader issues > here about the ways in which scholars try to claim authority for > their views]. > > Bill's follow-up on these issues makes clear that he believes there > is a way to adjudicate ethical choice such that he can assert, with > quiet confidence, the "moral superiority" of "interpretive methods." > I must confess that this claim makes me profoundly uncomfortable! > Why? First and foremost because it presupposes an answer to the > philosophical puzzle posed above, and I'm as yet uncommitted on > that. But also, a more tactical concern, is that my gut sense of the > sociology of contemporary political science would be that claiming > "moral superiority" is usually a sure fire way to anger rather than > engage (let alone persuade) those of different methodological points > of view, and is so because of a norm that holds such claims to be > "beyond the bounds" of the kinds of arguments that can be > legitimately deployed in meta-debates within the discipline. That > norm is itself, I suspect, rooted in the essentially Weberian > position that such claims are a matter of personal/cultural subje > ctive choice [I'd be fascinated to see what you all think about > where the norms of our discipline lie in this regard--I'd be happy > to have my empirical hypothesis "falsified"!]. > > Third and finally, I suspect this is an issue on which > "interpretivists" broadly conceived have firm disagreements. Hence > pushing a claim to the "moral superiority" of interpretivism not > only will not persuade non-"interpretivists" to revisit their > beliefs, but also has the potential to fragment any incipient > "interpretivist" movement. To be honest, I for one, would not be > comfortable calling myself an "interpretivist" if my disciplinary > colleagues associated this label with claims to "moral superiority" > over them! But perhaps I'm in a tiny oddball minority on this... > > Cheers, > > Robert Adcock > > ----- Original Message ----- > From: WJKELLPRO at aol.com > Date: Saturday, February 28, 2009 5:25 pm > Subject: [Interpretationandmethods] Game Theory > To: D.Yanow at fsw.vu.nl, interpretationandmethods at listserv.cddc.vt.edu > Cc: WJKELLPRO at aol.com > >> >> () Hi Again! >> Here's my response to Patrick, Dvora, and Suzanne: >> Get well soon, Patrick! >> On an emotional level, I agree completely with my brother Patrick's >> contempt >> for the hypocrisy of the game-playing game theorists. I think we are >> very >> close conceptually, too. >> First, I like the poetry of the term "monistic philosophical >> ontology." >> Secondly, I agree 100% that social science begins with empathy. The >> >> positivists are deeply engaged in an appalling conceptual absurdity. >> In their search >> for "objective knowledge," they try to remove the observer from the >> act of >> observation. Good luck! >> To me it seems obvious that humans observing human behavior is, first >> of >> all, a human-to-human relationship. Only because we are of the same >> sort, can >> we empathically understand one another. But empathy is not in itself >> a >> rational process. It is intuitive, mysterious, and thoroughly >> personal. Out of >> this intuitive process, which positivists pretend not to have, comes >> >> understanding. Understanding is the basis for verbalized >> explanations. >> There is also an ethical dimension embedded in the human-to-human >> relationship upon which empathy rests. To understand another person >> empathically >> requires that you acknowledge their humanity. And that entails an >> element of >> respect; unless one is deliberately misanthropic, which may be the >> case for some >> positivists. >> At this point, I disagree with my brother's separation of epistemology >> and >> ethics. To know another person requires that you acknowledge his or >> her >> humanity, just as you are human. In this process of knowing, respect >> is a natural >> element. It must be dealt with, either by acknowledging it, or >> denying it >> like the positivists do. In short, good social science requires >> clear >> self-awareness. Of course, it also requires clear terminology, and >> that is where >> Dvora's questions come in. >> Dvora: do we have a better way of thinking about these than the old >> dichotomous ones that claim that [we] are "only" interested in >> understanding, not >> 'explaining' or 'predicting'? I think I'm asking for a new definition >> of what >> it means to predict -- and I'm guessing that this would be a much >> broader >> understanding than the one based on experimentation and statistical >> inference. >> BILL: >> These are very important problems. If we can resolve them within our >> own >> framework, we will have come a long way towards having a unified >> system with >> which to challenge the power elites. >> For me the question is, what do these three terms - understanding, >> explanation, and prediction - mean in the context of interpretive >> social science. >> Words don't have abstract meanings, like satellites orbiting in >> space, because >> meaning is derived from the context involving a user's intention and >> a listener >> 's interpretation. The meanings the positivists give these words are >> >> designed to reinforce their interpretive framework. Therefore, I >> reject their >> meanings, and try to fashion meanings that will give more persuasive >> coherence to >> our theoretical point of view. >> Prediction differs from the other two words because of its orientation >> >> towards the future. But it also has similarities. Of the three >> terms, I think >> that understanding entails both explanation and prediction. An >> explanation is >> a systematic exposition of a person's understanding of a thing, >> event, >> concept, etc. Understanding itself can be pre-verbal, but >> explanation must be >> given in words. Prediction can be understood as a demonstration of >> both >> understanding and explanation. My present understanding, and >> explanation, of "A" >> suggests that event "B" will occur under X circumstances, at time T. >> If it >> all works-out, then my original understanding, and explanation based >> on it, has >> been, at least in some measure, confirmed, or validated. In other >> words, I >> can continue to hold my original understanding/explanation. >> If there are conflicts between the actual event and my prediction, >> then I >> must re-adjust my understanding. This re-adjustment can entail a >> slight >> modification of my understanding, or a complete rejection of it, and >> move me to >> search for a new understanding. >> In this way, the history of science can be interpreted as thoughtful >> people >> seeking a more satisfying understanding. This is their primary >> motivation. >> Explanation and prediction are secondary steps in the service of that >> primary >> motive. >> Explanation and prediction need not assume a mechanistic theory of >> causation. A prediction can be successful because the predictor >> understands a >> particular process well, and grasps its intentional trajectory. >> Suppose I predict that about 30% of the eligible electorate will vote >> in the >> next congressional elections. If that happens, I sit back and say "you >> see, >> I understand the intentional trajectory of the American voter." But >> if there >> is a 50% turnout, or a 15% turnout, then my head starts spinning, and >> I have >> to get to work to try and make sense of the event. The problem for >> me as a >> political scientist is to find a satisfactory understanding of >> events. When >> I have that, I try to persuade others of my explanation, and they >> accept it >> or criticize it. Then we go back and forth until we reach a >> consensus, or >> agree to disagree. >> On Fri, Feb 27, 2009 at 5:39 PM, <_psshea at csbs.utah.edu_ >> () > wrote: >> Suzanne Levi-Sanchez, >> >> "What can interpretive methods answer that game theory can't?" This >> is a big question. >> >> In brief, game theory makes assumptions about motivations and about >> how people "see" their world. So the game theorist posits that actors >> are playing a particular game, chicken or some form of the prisoners' >> dilemma. But how does the game theorist know that actors "see" the >> game that he or she posits? >> >> In contrast, interpretive methodologies ask directly about human >> meaning making rather than assuming how people see their worlds.. >> BILL: >> I agree. Game theory does not make the empathic effort to "know" >> what >> actors are experiencing. Instead, these "gamers" impose their >> conception of >> human nature upon the human behavior they purport to "explain." To >> me, their >> view is a shallow, myopic, unreal, and offensive distortion of me and >> the >> people I have known. I see interpretive methods as morally superior >> to >> human-denying positivistic methodologies. >> I think that our moral superiority is our key advantage in winning >> the fight >> for academic prominence. >> Bill Kelleher >> >> >> >> **************A Good Credit Score is 700 or Above. See yours in just 2 >> easy >> steps! >> ( >> %3D62%26bcd%3DfebemailfooterNO62) >> _______________________________________________ >> Interpretationandmethods mailing list >> Interpretationandmethods at listserv.cddc.vt.edu >> > _______________________________________________ > Interpretationandmethods mailing list > Interpretationandmethods at listserv.cddc.vt.edu > http://listserv.cddc.vt.edu/mailman/listinfo/interpretationandmethods > > -- Peregrine Schwartz-Shea Professor University of Utah Political Science Department 260 South Central Campus Drive Rm 252 Salt Lake City, UT 84112-9152 (801) 581-6300 phone mail psshea at poli-sci.utah.edu _______________________________________________ Interpretationandmethods mailing list Interpretationandmethods at listserv.cddc.vt.edu http://listserv.cddc.vt.edu/mailman/listinfo/interpretationandmethods _______________________________________________ Interpretationandmethods mailing list Interpretationandmethods at listserv.cddc.vt.edu http://listserv.cddc.vt.edu/mailman/listinfo/interpretationandmethods _______________________________________________ Interpretationandmethods mailing list Interpretationandmethods at listserv.cddc.vt.edu http://listserv.cddc.vt.edu/mailman/listinfo/interpretationandmethods From wyoder at ppcms.org Sun Mar 1 20:16:39 2009 From: wyoder at ppcms.org (Warren Yoder) Date: Sun, 1 Mar 2009 19:16:39 -0600 Subject: [Interpretationandmethods] Interpretivism and ethics In-Reply-To: <5286BEEC21FADA47A24AA92D8BC9270E028A3993@fswmail01.scw.vu.nl> References: <304907822.834761235940655532.JavaMail.root@ganesh.brynmawr.edu> <5286BEEC21FADA47A24AA92D8BC9270E028A3993@fswmail01.scw.vu.nl> Message-ID: <9F3E1DEE-C507-40C6-A533-B337FE3BAC9B@ppcms.org> Dvora, You have the right to claim that all humans are meaning-makers, because we are. Meaning-making is universally present in humans. We can posit the ability developed because it conferred evolutionary advantage as we sought to understand, predict, and control our environment. Now it is a human imperative. Asking "that social science should investigate those processes and specific meanings" is an additional step, but an eminently reasonable one. Someone has to investigate these meanings, or we might cease to be meaning-makers. Then what would we be? Warren Yoder Jackson State University, and Public Policy Center of Mississippi On Mar 1, 2009, at 3:10 PM, Dvora Yanow wrote: > > Thanks for this, Sandy. > > Do you already have pub data for the forthcoming article? If so, > can you please post it? or let us know where to look, and about when? > > And: "and not always rational to them personally." -- isn't this > the underside of the enforced narrowing and attributional > apparatuses of various games? > > Oh, oh -- I wasn't going to go here, because I hold with Robert on > not claiming to be 'closer to God' or that someone else's method is > 'morally' inferior, but it suddenly strikes me that this sort of > unspoken claim is exactly what so enfuriates me about such > theorizing: who/what gives someone the moral right to claim that > all humans behave in X way (and if they don't, they are somehow > inferior human beings)? > > But having fallen into that line of thinking, I want to point that > same gun at myself: what gives me the moral right to claim that all > humans are meaning-making (and therefore that social science should > investigate those processes and specific meanings)? Uh, but > somehow, it's not, or doesn't feel like, the same thing. Why? > > Thanks, > Dvora, who is appalled by the language of candidates and counselors!!! -------------- next part -------------- An HTML attachment was scrubbed... URL: http://listserv.cddc.vt.edu/pipermail/interpretationandmethods/attachments/20090301/ba2823e9/attachment.html From jhuns at vt.edu Sun Mar 1 20:21:31 2009 From: jhuns at vt.edu (jeremy hunsinger) Date: Sun, 1 Mar 2009 20:21:31 -0500 Subject: [Interpretationandmethods] Interpretivism and ethics In-Reply-To: <9F3E1DEE-C507-40C6-A533-B337FE3BAC9B@ppcms.org> References: <304907822.834761235940655532.JavaMail.root@ganesh.brynmawr.edu> <5286BEEC21FADA47A24AA92D8BC9270E028A3993@fswmail01.scw.vu.nl> <9F3E1DEE-C507-40C6-A533-B337FE3BAC9B@ppcms.org> Message-ID: <37D8DEEC-5769-4F7D-8F53-D0BBB066629A@vt.edu> > > Asking "that social science should investigate those processes and > specific meanings" is an additional step, but an eminently > reasonable one. Someone has to investigate these meanings, or we > might cease to be meaning-makers. Then what would we be? > rational actors?, sorry joke had to be made. Is my history wrong, or isn't there a history that goes cybernetics(wanted to take interpretation out of the system) ->systems theory/information theory -> rational choice theory > Warren Yoder > Jackson State University, and > Public Policy Center of Mississippi > > From vpdrul at essex.ac.uk Mon Mar 2 06:25:14 2009 From: vpdrul at essex.ac.uk (Druliolle, Vincent P) Date: Mon, 2 Mar 2009 11:25:14 -0000 Subject: [Interpretationandmethods] =?iso-8859-1?q?RE=A0=3A__Visual_Analys?= =?iso-8859-1?q?is_NOWpolitical=09cartoons?= References: <28340113.1235922316412.JavaMail.root@mswamui-billy.atl.sa.earthlink.net> Message-ID: <7AC902A40BEDD411A3A800D0B7847B661C7F76DF@sernt14.essex.ac.uk> Thank you very much Eric, Dvora and Terrell (the brief history of cartoons on the page you mention is really interesting) Eric, I'm not really surprised some IR people have been interested in cartoons more than other politics scholars as they have turned to the importance and role of images and the visual for quite some time. See for example Security Dialogue, 2007, 38(2) June, there's an article on Steve Bell's cartoons in The Guardian (the author, Klaus Doss, had already written on his cartoons). Thanks again Best Vincent ________________________________ De: interpretationandmethods-bounces at listserv.cddc.vt.edu de la part de tfcarver at earthlink.net Date: dim. 01/03/2009 15:45 ?: interpretation and methods group Objet : Re: [Interpretationandmethods] Visual Analysis NOWpolitical cartoons Re: political cartoons, Sammy Basu at Willamette is a specialist and has a webpage, incl. reading/factsheet/etc etc. Fun, if nothing else, and might answer some questions. http://www.willamette.edu/~sbasu/polixxx/PoliticalCartoonHistory.htm bw, Terrell Carver -----Original Message----- From: Dvora Yanow Sent: Mar 1, 2009 2:28 PM To: interpretation and methods group Subject: Re: [Interpretationandmethods] Visual Analysis NOW political cartoons Thanks, Eric. Another source is political sociologist Bill Gamson. I don't have the reference for the paper in which he and a co-author took this up, but see: Gamson, William. 1992. Talking Politics. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. Murray Edelman may also have engaged this in one of his books, but my memory is not clear on this, and I don't have the books at home to check. Dvora Yanow -----Original Message----- From: interpretationandmethods-bounces at malagigi.cddc.vt.edu on behalf of Eric Blanchard Sent: Sat 28-Feb-09 09:40 To: interpretation and methods group Subject: Re: [Interpretationandmethods] Visual Analysis ... Lene Hansen of the University of Copenhagen is doing some interesting work on discourse analysis and images, including political cartoons, within the framework of International Relations. You might contact her to see if she'd share one of her ISA conference papers on the subject or check the ISA paper archive. Best, Eric On 2/26/09 3:32 PM, "Druliolle, Vincent P" wrote: > Hi everyone > > > > > I'm a final year PhD candidate at the University of Essex, Department of > Government. My work is on commemorative practices in post-authoritarian > Argentina, and that's how I came to be interested in questions of images and > the visual and politics. So I felt maybe I could add a few suggestions about > some material I am familiar with. ... > > > I would actually like to take this opportunity to ask for some advice. I was > wondering if you may have any sources to recommend on the study of political > cartoons? Any suggestion would be greatly appreciated!! > > > > > Best > > VincenT. > Professor Terrell Carver Department of Politics University of Bristol 10 Priory Road Bristol BS8 1TU United Kingdom +44 (0)117 928 8826 www.bristol.ac.uk/politics From lrudolph at uchicago.edu Mon Mar 2 00:29:59 2009 From: lrudolph at uchicago.edu (Lloyd Rudolph) Date: Mon, 2 Mar 2009 10:59:59 +0530 Subject: [Interpretationandmethods] discussion between Dvora and Patrick Jackson Message-ID: Reading the exchanges puts me in mind of our case for subjective knowledge. I am attaching an article on the subject. Lloyd Rudolph [and Susanne Rudolph] Professor of Political Science Emeritus University of Chicago email: lrudolph at uchicago.edu. USA cell: 510-499-4740 India cell: 0-94140-52178 Jan - March: A 57 Shanti Path, Tilak Nagar, Jaipur, Rajasthan 302004, India. Ph +91-141-402-2876. Fax +91-141-262-3015 April - May and October - December: 2 Ardmore Road, Kensington, CA 9 4707, USA. Ph +510-526-3589. Fax 510-526-8637 June - September: Box 117, 6298 Stage Road, Barnard, VT 05031, USA. Ph +802-234-9844. Fax 802-234-5261 -------------- next part -------------- An HTML attachment was scrubbed... URL: http://listserv.cddc.vt.edu/pipermail/interpretationandmethods/attachments/20090302/0f2b6fd4/attachment-0002.html -------------- next part -------------- A non-text attachment was scrubbed... Name: engaging subjective knowledge#0.pdf Type: application/pdf Size: 1107392 bytes Desc: not available Url : http://listserv.cddc.vt.edu/pipermail/interpretationandmethods/attachments/20090302/0f2b6fd4/attachment-0001.pdf -------------- next part -------------- An HTML attachment was scrubbed... URL: http://listserv.cddc.vt.edu/pipermail/interpretationandmethods/attachments/20090302/0f2b6fd4/attachment-0003.html From sule.sanchez at gmail.com Sun Mar 1 18:49:29 2009 From: sule.sanchez at gmail.com (Suzanne Levi-Sanchez) Date: Sun, 1 Mar 2009 18:49:29 -0500 Subject: [Interpretationandmethods] Test... Message-ID: Test On Sun, Mar 1, 2009 at 4:57 PM, Sanford Schram wrote: > Much of what we report on from our project is available at: > > http://www.uky.edu/~rford/Home_files/page0001.htm > > > The articles from our project that focus on this dimension of welfare > reform include: > > Schram, Sanford F., Joe Soss, Richard C. Fording and Linda Houser. 2009. > "Deciding to Discipline: Race, Choice, and Punishment at the Frontlines of > Welfare Reform." American Sociological Review, 74. 3 (June): forthcoming. > > Soss, Joe, Richard C. Fording, and Sanford F. Schram. n.d. "The > Organization of Discipline: From Performance Management to Perversity and > Punishment." Journal of Public Administration Research and Theory (under > review). > > Schram, Sanford F., Richard Fording, and Joe Soss. 2008. "Neoliberal > Poverty Governance: Race, Place and the Punitive Turn in U.S. Welfare > Policy." Cambridge Journal of Regions, Economy and Society 1, 1 (April > 2008): 17-36. > > Schram, Sanford F., Joe Soss, and Richard Fording. n.d. "The Third Level of > U.S. Welfare Reform: Neoliberal Pedagogy." Citizenship Studies (under > review). > > The book is to be written yet but under contract: > > Joe Soss, Richard C. Fording and Sanford F. Schram, Deciding to Discipline: > Neoliberal Paternalism and the Persistent Power of Race (University of > Chicago Press) > > > > ----- Original Message ----- > From: "Dvora Yanow" > To: "interpretation and methods group" < > interpretationandmethods at malagigi.cddc.vt.edu> > Sent: Sunday, March 1, 2009 4:10:48 PM GMT -05:00 US/Canada Eastern > Subject: Re: [Interpretationandmethods] Interpretivism and ethics > > > RE: [Interpretationandmethods] Interpretivism and ethics > > > Thanks for this, Sandy. > > Do you already have pub data for the forthcoming article? If so, can you > please post it? or let us know where to look, and about when? > > And: "and not always rational to them personally." -- isn't this the > underside of the enforced narrowing and attributional apparatuses of various > games? > > Oh, oh -- I wasn't going to go here, because I hold with Robert on not > claiming to be 'closer to God' or that someone else's method is 'morally' > inferior, but it suddenly strikes me that this sort of unspoken claim is > exactly what so enfuriates me about such theorizing: who/what gives someone > the moral right to claim that all humans behave in X way (and if they don't, > they are somehow inferior human beings)? > > But having fallen into that line of thinking, I want to point that same gun > at myself: what gives me the moral right to claim that all humans are > meaning-making (and therefore that social science should investigate those > processes and specific meanings)? Uh, but somehow, it's not, or doesn't feel > like, the same thing. Why? > > Thanks, > Dvora, who is appalled by the language of candidates and counselors!!! > > > -----Original Message----- > From: interpretationandmethods-bounces at malagigi.cddc.vt.edu on behalf of > Sanford Schram > Sent: Sun 01-Mar-09 21:50 > To: interpretation and methods group > Subject: Re: [Interpretationandmethods] Interpretivism and ethics > > Great discussion. I have just three small points: > > (1) the Jack Gunnell article Robert Adcock mentions is something I think > everyone should read, he explicitly ties Weber and Oakschott to the > perestroika debate; > > (2) I venture to say that Patrick does not follow Gunnell on Weber :) as we > have hashed out on the perestroika list a few years back; and > > (3) rational choice models, including game theoretic models, make a lot of > sense in highly constrained decision systems where participants have almost > no choice but to all think like they drank the kool-aid of utility > maximization (however defined by that context. > > On the last point, take the example of welfare-to-work case managers who > work under enormous pressure to meet personal statistical benchmarks of the > performance management system that their agency and the state government > have implemented to track the movement of recipients off the rolls and into > jobs. Many of these case workers are single mother former recipients > themselves who are torn about taking a cutthroat, bottom-line "business > model" approach to working with their clients (now often called > "candidates," as in job candidates). Regardless of their access to local > knowledge and alternative understandings of the lives of welfare recipients, > these case managers (who themselves are now sometimes referred to as "career > counselors") have no choice but to follow the logic of the system and punish > recipients with financial penalties if they make missteps in fulfilling the > conditions of their welfare-to-work contracts. The contract agency's own > funding is contingent upon withhol > ding funding from recipients who are not compliant. Case managers must > enforce discipline on their clients by reducing their benefits where > required or they themselves could see reductions in their pay. The Florida > welfare-to-work system is an excellent example of this system. In this > scenario, case managers end up often making "rational" choices about who to > penalize that are rational only under the performance management system in > which they operate and not always rational to them personally. That is why a > number the case managers cry during in-depth interviewing about how they > feel uncomfortable working in such a system. Others are less troubled, but > express ambivalence nonetheless. Others go to great lengths to rationalize > their extensive reliance on sanctioning to enforce discipline on their > clients. > > Rationality is always context specific and the context needs to be > explicated if we are ever to understand what is rational in any situation, > social setting, agency environment, etc. Understanding the context for what > is rational is surely an interpretive act implicit in all rational models. > But once explicated, the models have great utility in the appropriate > context. > > Mixed-methods research helps to employ statistical models while accounting > for context. My forthcoming co-authored study on welfare reform, with Joe > Soss and Richard Fording, hopes to illustrate this. > > > ----- Original Message ----- > From: psshea at csbs.utah.edu > To: interpretationandmethods at listserv.cddc.vt.edu > Sent: Sunday, March 1, 2009 1:56:52 PM GMT -05:00 US/Canada Eastern > Subject: Re: [Interpretationandmethods] Interpretivism and ethics > > Robert, Thanks for raising this issue. Apologies to the list for > giving another citation but I think it is relevant some of the issues > you've raised: > > Schwartz-Shea, P. "Conundrums in the Practice of Pluralism." In > Sanford Schram and Brian Caterino, eds., Making Political Science > Matter: Debating Knowledge, Research, and Method. New York: NYU > Press, 2006, 209-221. > > Specifically, I argue in my last paragraph: > > ... It is this third sort of pluralism that can, in the long run, > produce a more honest and relevant social science-a social science > that matters because it asks questions of justice about every facet of > the research process. To be clear, I am not arguing that the answers > to such questions are straight-forward. ***And facile judgments-that > one set of research questions, methods, theories or approaches are > automatically on side of justice whereas others serve only the > powerful-must be vigorously resisted.*** Rather individual scholars > and scholarly communities need to more consistently and persistently > ask questions about who benefits from research and to theorize > researchers' complex positioning in the political world. It is > reflexivity on, rather than denial of, our politics that will make > structural pluralism more productive of social science research that > matters. > > Peri S-S > > > Quoting Robert Adcock : > > > Dear all, > > > > This exchange has been fantastic! I want to single in on one key > > issue that's come up in particular in the contributions by Patrick > > and Bill. > > > > Patrick stressed that ethical choices/commitments underwrite his > > preference for ethnographic/participant observation methods over > > rationalist game theory. I think he's does a great service here in > > carefully and clearly flagging for our attention the role > > "value-commitments" either implicitly (or preferably) > > self-consciously play in our intellectual attraction to one method > > or another. This raises in turn the question of how (and indeed if) > > such "value-commitments" can be themselves justified using one or > > another type of scholarly method/argument. I have long been > > puzzled/troubled over this issue and would be fascinated to hear > > more from Patrick to help me think more about it. He makes clear > > that he does not believe that empirical evidence can be brought to > > bear in this domain, but is there still a role for reason (of a > > non-instrumental form) in adjudicating such choices, or are we to > > interpret them ultimately as personal (or cultural) preferences. > > This is, on my reading, Web > > er's view and I'm wondering if Patrick follows Weber on this? [As an > > aside the latest issue of Political Research Quarterly has a great > > exposition by Jack Gunnell of Weber's views and the broader issues > > here about the ways in which scholars try to claim authority for > > their views]. > > > > Bill's follow-up on these issues makes clear that he believes there > > is a way to adjudicate ethical choice such that he can assert, with > > quiet confidence, the "moral superiority" of "interpretive methods." > > I must confess that this claim makes me profoundly uncomfortable! > > Why? First and foremost because it presupposes an answer to the > > philosophical puzzle posed above, and I'm as yet uncommitted on > > that. But also, a more tactical concern, is that my gut sense of the > > sociology of contemporary political science would be that claiming > > "moral superiority" is usually a sure fire way to anger rather than > > engage (let alone persuade) those of different methodological points > > of view, and is so because of a norm that holds such claims to be > > "beyond the bounds" of the kinds of arguments that can be > > legitimately deployed in meta-debates within the discipline. That > > norm is itself, I suspect, rooted in the essentially Weberian > > position that such claims are a matter of personal/cultural subje > > ctive choice [I'd be fascinated to see what you all think about > > where the norms of our discipline lie in this regard--I'd be happy > > to have my empirical hypothesis "falsified"!]. > > > > Third and finally, I suspect this is an issue on which > > "interpretivists" broadly conceived have firm disagreements. Hence > > pushing a claim to the "moral superiority" of interpretivism not > > only will not persuade non-"interpretivists" to revisit their > > beliefs, but also has the potential to fragment any incipient > > "interpretivist" movement. To be honest, I for one, would not be > > comfortable calling myself an "interpretivist" if my disciplinary > > colleagues associated this label with claims to "moral superiority" > > over them! But perhaps I'm in a tiny oddball minority on this... > > > > Cheers, > > > > Robert Adcock > > > > ----- Original Message ----- > > From: WJKELLPRO at aol.com > > Date: Saturday, February 28, 2009 5:25 pm > > Subject: [Interpretationandmethods] Game Theory > > To: D.Yanow at fsw.vu.nl, interpretationandmethods at listserv.cddc.vt.edu > > Cc: WJKELLPRO at aol.com > > > >> > >> () Hi Again! > >> Here's my response to Patrick, Dvora, and Suzanne: > >> Get well soon, Patrick! > >> On an emotional level, I agree completely with my brother Patrick's > >> contempt > >> for the hypocrisy of the game-playing game theorists. I think we are > >> very > >> close conceptually, too. > >> First, I like the poetry of the term "monistic philosophical > >> ontology." > >> Secondly, I agree 100% that social science begins with empathy. The > >> > >> positivists are deeply engaged in an appalling conceptual absurdity. > >> In their search > >> for "objective knowledge," they try to remove the observer from the > >> act of > >> observation. Good luck! > >> To me it seems obvious that humans observing human behavior is, first > >> of > >> all, a human-to-human relationship. Only because we are of the same > >> sort, can > >> we empathically understand one another. But empathy is not in itself > >> a > >> rational process. It is intuitive, mysterious, and thoroughly > >> personal. Out of > >> this intuitive process, which positivists pretend not to have, comes > >> > >> understanding. Understanding is the basis for verbalized > >> explanations. > >> There is also an ethical dimension embedded in the human-to-human > >> relationship upon which empathy rests. To understand another person > >> empathically > >> requires that you acknowledge their humanity. And that entails an > >> element of > >> respect; unless one is deliberately misanthropic, which may be the > >> case for some > >> positivists. > >> At this point, I disagree with my brother's separation of epistemology > >> and > >> ethics. To know another person requires that you acknowledge his or > >> her > >> humanity, just as you are human. In this process of knowing, respect > >> is a natural > >> element. It must be dealt with, either by acknowledging it, or > >> denying it > >> like the positivists do. In short, good social science requires > >> clear > >> self-awareness. Of course, it also requires clear terminology, and > >> that is where > >> Dvora's questions come in. > >> Dvora: do we have a better way of thinking about these than the old > >> dichotomous ones that claim that [we] are "only" interested in > >> understanding, not > >> 'explaining' or 'predicting'? I think I'm asking for a new definition > >> of what > >> it means to predict -- and I'm guessing that this would be a much > >> broader > >> understanding than the one based on experimentation and statistical > >> inference. > >> BILL: > >> These are very important problems. If we can resolve them within our > >> own > >> framework, we will have come a long way towards having a unified > >> system with > >> which to challenge the power elites. > >> For me the question is, what do these three terms - understanding, > >> explanation, and prediction - mean in the context of interpretive > >> social science. > >> Words don't have abstract meanings, like satellites orbiting in > >> space, because > >> meaning is derived from the context involving a user's intention and > >> a listener > >> 's interpretation. The meanings the positivists give these words are > >> > >> designed to reinforce their interpretive framework. Therefore, I > >> reject their > >> meanings, and try to fashion meanings that will give more persuasive > >> coherence to > >> our theoretical point of view. > >> Prediction differs from the other two words because of its orientation > >> > >> towards the future. But it also has similarities. Of the three > >> terms, I think > >> that understanding entails both explanation and prediction. An > >> explanation is > >> a systematic exposition of a person's understanding of a thing, > >> event, > >> concept, etc. Understanding itself can be pre-verbal, but > >> explanation must be > >> given in words. Prediction can be understood as a demonstration of > >> both > >> understanding and explanation. My present understanding, and > >> explanation, of "A" > >> suggests that event "B" will occur under X circumstances, at time T. > >> If it > >> all works-out, then my original understanding, and explanation based > >> on it, has > >> been, at least in some measure, confirmed, or validated. In other > >> words, I > >> can continue to hold my original understanding/explanation. > >> If there are conflicts between the actual event and my prediction, > >> then I > >> must re-adjust my understanding. This re-adjustment can entail a > >> slight > >> modification of my understanding, or a complete rejection of it, and > >> move me to > >> search for a new understanding. > >> In this way, the history of science can be interpreted as thoughtful > >> people > >> seeking a more satisfying understanding. This is their primary > >> motivation. > >> Explanation and prediction are secondary steps in the service of that > >> primary > >> motive. > >> Explanation and prediction need not assume a mechanistic theory of > >> causation. A prediction can be successful because the predictor > >> understands a > >> particular process well, and grasps its intentional trajectory. > >> Suppose I predict that about 30% of the eligible electorate will vote > >> in the > >> next congressional elections. If that happens, I sit back and say "you > >> see, > >> I understand the intentional trajectory of the American voter." But > >> if there > >> is a 50% turnout, or a 15% turnout, then my head starts spinning, and > >> I have > >> to get to work to try and make sense of the event. The problem for > >> me as a > >> political scientist is to find a satisfactory understanding of > >> events. When > >> I have that, I try to persuade others of my explanation, and they > >> accept it > >> or criticize it. Then we go back and forth until we reach a > >> consensus, or > >> agree to disagree. > >> On Fri, Feb 27, 2009 at 5:39 PM, <_psshea at csbs.utah.edu_ > >> () > wrote: > >> Suzanne Levi-Sanchez, > >> > >> "What can interpretive methods answer that game theory can't?" This > >> is a big question. > >> > >> In brief, game theory makes assumptions about motivations and about > >> how people "see" their world. So the game theorist posits that actors > >> are playing a particular game, chicken or some form of the prisoners' > >> dilemma. But how does the game theorist know that actors "see" the > >> game that he or she posits? > >> > >> In contrast, interpretive methodologies ask directly about human > >> meaning making rather than assuming how people see their worlds.. > >> BILL: > >> I agree. Game theory does not make the empathic effort to "know" > >> what > >> actors are experiencing. Instead, these "gamers" impose their > >> conception of > >> human nature upon the human behavior they purport to "explain." To > >> me, their > >> view is a shallow, myopic, unreal, and offensive distortion of me and > >> the > >> people I have known. I see interpretive methods as morally superior > >> to > >> human-denying positivistic methodologies. > >> I think that our moral superiority is our key advantage in winning > >> the fight > >> for academic prominence. > >> Bill Kelleher > >> > >> > >> > >> **************A Good Credit Score is 700 or Above. See yours in just 2 > >> easy > >> steps! > >> ( > >> %3D62%26bcd%3DfebemailfooterNO62) > >> _______________________________________________ > >> Interpretationandmethods mailing list > >> Interpretationandmethods at listserv.cddc.vt.edu > >> > > _______________________________________________ > > Interpretationandmethods mailing list > > Interpretationandmethods at listserv.cddc.vt.edu > > http://listserv.cddc.vt.edu/mailman/listinfo/interpretationandmethods > > > > > > > > -- > Peregrine Schwartz-Shea > Professor > > University of Utah > Political Science Department > 260 South Central Campus Drive Rm 252 > Salt Lake City, UT 84112-9152 > > (801) 581-6300 phone mail > psshea at poli-sci.utah.edu > > > > _______________________________________________ > Interpretationandmethods mailing list > Interpretationandmethods at listserv.cddc.vt.edu > http://listserv.cddc.vt.edu/mailman/listinfo/interpretationandmethods > _______________________________________________ > Interpretationandmethods mailing list > Interpretationandmethods at listserv.cddc.vt.edu > http://listserv.cddc.vt.edu/mailman/listinfo/interpretationandmethods > > > _______________________________________________ > Interpretationandmethods mailing list > Interpretationandmethods at listserv.cddc.vt.edu > http://listserv.cddc.vt.edu/mailman/listinfo/interpretationandmethods > _______________________________________________ > Interpretationandmethods mailing list > Interpretationandmethods at listserv.cddc.vt.edu > http://listserv.cddc.vt.edu/mailman/listinfo/interpretationandmethods > -------------- next part -------------- An HTML attachment was scrubbed... URL: http://listserv.cddc.vt.edu/pipermail/interpretationandmethods/attachments/20090301/cc6f5e0e/attachment-0001.html From auroville1976 at yahoo.co.uk Mon Mar 2 10:18:19 2009 From: auroville1976 at yahoo.co.uk (Aurogeeta Das) Date: Mon, 2 Mar 2009 15:18:19 +0000 (GMT) Subject: [Interpretationandmethods] discussion between Dvora and Patrick Jackson In-Reply-To: Message-ID: <645539.64717.qm@web25213.mail.ukl.yahoo.com> Hi Lloyd, Thank you very much for sending this text, which has come just in time to help me write my chapter on methodology! Apologies if this is evident in the text, but I am not entirely sure where the text was published. Can you send me a complete reference? Thanks again, I found it wonderfully nuanced in methodological insights, and of course the material sounds fascinating! Best, Aurogeeta --- On Mon, 2/3/09, Lloyd Rudolph wrote: > From: Lloyd Rudolph > Subject: [Interpretationandmethods] discussion between Dvora and Patrick Jackson > To: interpretationandmethods at malagigi.cddc.vt.edu > Date: Monday, 2 March, 2009, 10:59 AM > Reading the exchanges puts me in mind of our case for > subjective knowledge. I am attaching an article on the > subject. Lloyd Rudolph [and Susanne Rudolph] > > > Professor of Political Science Emeritus > University of Chicago > email: lrudolph at uchicago.edu. > USA cell: 510-499-4740 India cell: 0-94140-52178 > Jan - March: A 57 Shanti Path, Tilak Nagar, Jaipur, > Rajasthan 302004, India. Ph +91-141-402-2876. Fax > +91-141-262-3015 > April - May and October - December: 2 Ardmore Road, > Kensington, CA 9 > 4707, USA. Ph +510-526-3589. Fax 510-526-8637 > June - September: Box 117, 6298 Stage Road, Barnard, VT > 05031, USA. Ph +802-234-9844. Fax 802-234-5261 > > _______________________________________________ > Interpretationandmethods mailing list > Interpretationandmethods at listserv.cddc.vt.edu > http://listserv.cddc.vt.edu/mailman/listinfo/interpretationandmethods From WJKELLPRO at aol.com Mon Mar 2 15:29:45 2009 From: WJKELLPRO at aol.com (WJKELLPRO at aol.com) Date: Mon, 2 Mar 2009 15:29:45 EST Subject: [Interpretationandmethods] OUR MORAL SUPERIORTY Message-ID: In a message dated 3/1/2009, Robert writes: Dear all, This exchange has been fantastic! I want to single in on one key issue that's come up in particular in the contributions by Patrick and Bill. [RE Patrick?s comments on his choice of methods]? is there still a role for reason (of a non-instrumental form) in adjudicating such choices, or are we to interpret them ultimately as personal (or cultural) preferences?. Bill's follow-up on these issues makes clear that he believes there is a way to adjudicate ethical choice such that he can assert, with quiet confidence, the "moral superiority" of "interpretive methods." I must confess that this claim makes me profoundly uncomfortable! BILL: Thanks for this stimulating challenge, Robert. I agree that to speak of our moral superiority sounds somewhat na?ve, arrogant, and intemperate. However, if I can make my case for it, I think you might agree with me that this language is both apt and useful to our cause. First, consider the values of the dominant positivistic paradigm for game theory, and for social and political science generally. Adherents to that framework value a specific set of presuppositions about human nature, human behavior, and about how that behavior can be understood and explained. In short, humans are a type of organic computational mechanism. People are assumed to follow a ?program? developed by natural selection. That is, humans automatically calculate, or compute, their own best interest whenever they are in a situation in which they must make a selection from among known options. Human behavior is ?explained,? at least to their satisfaction, when it is accounted for in these terms. Notice that this model has no room in it for authentic altruistic behavior. The only idea of moral conduct for this kind of rationality is ?enlightened self-interest.? That is, behavior selfishly aimed at gaining an award or avoiding a punishment. This view does not acknowledge behavior that gives or serves without expectation of reciprocity or calculation of selfish gain. Nor does this paradigm either assert any moral standards by which to evaluate the goodness of human conduct, or recognize the ?scientific? relevance of such standards. Second, try applying this model to yourself, and to the people you know. Using your own common sense, developed by your own personal experience, try asking yourself if this model really sounds like you, or the people you know. Personally, I reject that model for several reasons. In my experience, human behavior is full of acts of authentic altruism, moral self-restraint, and unselfish caring about the well being of other people, even strangers. What kind of ?science? is it that says it can explain human behavior, but you must block off what may be the major part of that behavior so as to find the ?explanation? satisfying? In the light of common sense, doesn?t this requirement result in a curious anomaly? If their theory of human rationality as strictly the calculation of self-interest conflicts with common experience and common sense, then how is rationality to be understood? I discuss all of this in more detail in my paper on Polanyi, but, in short, I understand human rationality as entailing a logical component, a practical means-end component, and a moral component. In The Study of Man, Polanyi suggests using the ?rational person? standard as a routine step in constructing social science accounts of human behavior. A ?rational person,? in his view, not only calculates a self-serving course of action, but adjusts that calculation in consideration of the well being of other people. White people, for example, working in the pre-Civil War underground railroad took personal risks to help to free other humans. These people weren?t acting just to feed their egos, or to gain fame, or to boost their status among their peers. Remember ?Schindler?s List?? Who would really be satisfied with a game theory accounting for this conduct? In my view, human beings are born with social emotions, like all social animals. These were bred into our brains through evolution. Humans may be unique in having a natural feeling of regard for the well being of other humans, not just kin, but including strangers. Every normal human being has a natural sense of respect for other folks as precious forms of life. This sense can be diminished or enhanced by socialization. "Rational behavior? is guided by these social emotions. In accounting for human behavior, then, an assessment of its positive or negative regard for others must be included in every fully scientific explanation. Science strives to account for all the facts, not just the convenient ones. Exactly opposite to game theory, behavior which selfishly disregards the welfare of others, or deliberately acts against that welfare, is not fully rational behavior. 90% of everyday behavior by humans is rational because it is respectful of others. That 10%, or whatever it is, which is less than fully rational requires an explanation as to why it is less than human. The history of 19th Century ?Robber Barons,? for example, could be re-written in this light; i.e., why was their conduct less than fully human? I realize that this kind of accounting for human behavior is currently a taboo in the academic community, where positivism reigns. However, in the real world, where governing must be done, a fully mature interpretive social science method is already in use, and is well established. You will find it in the law of Torts. For at least a century, courts have developed to a very high degree of sophistication what the law calls ?the reasonable person standard.? This standard accounts for the degree of human regard shown by a person?s conduct. The law assumes what I have said about human rationality. The method followed includes a) establishing the facts to be considered; b) interpreting the meanings of the actors; and, c) evaluating the degree of human regard displayed by the defendant in that behavioral context. Of course, courts have the power and responsibility to impose civil penalties for the negligent and intentional harming of another person. I suggest that social science should not try to usurp that function, but only publish reports which establish facts, interpret meanings, and evaluate the degree of human regard manifested in the given context. Here, then, is the method that can be used to depose positivism, and to replace it with a morally superior form of social and political science. By doing that, we can claim for our science the position once held by religion, as the central source of moral teaching in a civilized society. Believe it! Bill Kelleher **************A Good Credit Score is 700 or Above. See yours in just 2 easy steps! (http://pr.atwola.com/promoclk/100126575x1219957551x1201325337/aol?redir=http:%2F%2Fwww.freecreditreport.com%2Fpm%2Fdefault.aspx%3Fsc%3D668072%26hmpgID %3D62%26bcd%3DfebemailfooterNO62) -------------- next part -------------- An HTML attachment was scrubbed... URL: http://listserv.cddc.vt.edu/pipermail/interpretationandmethods/attachments/20090302/16509fe5/attachment-0001.html From WJKELLPRO at aol.com Mon Mar 2 15:57:53 2009 From: WJKELLPRO at aol.com (WJKELLPRO at aol.com) Date: Mon, 2 Mar 2009 15:57:53 EST Subject: [Interpretationandmethods] Test... Message-ID: Hello All! After you click on the "Reply" icon, please take the time to execute one more very important action. Please darken and cut all the commentary below your reply. Among other good things, this helps to save space in the archives. Thanks, BK **************A Good Credit Score is 700 or Above. See yours in just 2 easy steps! (http://pr.atwola.com/promoclk/100126575x1219957551x1201325337/aol?redir=http:%2F%2Fwww.freecreditreport.com%2Fpm%2Fdefault.aspx%3Fsc%3D668072%26hmpgID %3D62%26bcd%3DfebemailfooterNO62) -------------- next part -------------- An HTML attachment was scrubbed... URL: http://listserv.cddc.vt.edu/pipermail/interpretationandmethods/attachments/20090302/04e41ff2/attachment.html From D.Yanow at fsw.vu.nl Tue Mar 3 06:02:59 2009 From: D.Yanow at fsw.vu.nl (Dvora Yanow) Date: Tue, 3 Mar 2009 12:02:59 +0100 Subject: [Interpretationandmethods] an online journal of note Message-ID: <5286BEEC21FADA47A24AA92D8BC9270E01FBBF49@fswmail01.scw.vu.nl> fyi, an online journal: Forum Qualitative Sozialforschung / Forum: Qualitative Social Research articles, reviews, etc. in English, German, Spanish http://www.qualitative-research.net/index.php/fqs/index Dvora Yanow -------------- next part -------------- An HTML attachment was scrubbed... URL: http://listserv.cddc.vt.edu/pipermail/interpretationandmethods/attachments/20090303/8bec0de4/attachment.html From psshea at csbs.utah.edu Tue Mar 3 07:23:53 2009 From: psshea at csbs.utah.edu (psshea at csbs.utah.edu) Date: Tue, 03 Mar 2009 05:23:53 -0700 Subject: [Interpretationandmethods] more thoughts on game theory for Suzanne Message-ID: <20090303052353.fjlcyxlmowwc0kkg@webmail.csbs.utah.edu> Personally, I am quite taken with Patrick?s perspective on theory ? i.e., his _prosthetic_ approach that treats theory interpretively as offering particular frameworks for investigating and understanding the world (see e.g., his Making Sense of Making Sense in Yanow & Schwartz-Shea, 2006). It is a perspective that is both playful and profoundly pluralistic. [When I first read it, I found this attitude towards theory liberating because I experienced it as taking _theory_ and theorizing down a notch; there is often a reverent tone towards theory and theorizing as if who those do it (esp. a priori) come from some higher plain (where only the best and the brightest live).] PTJ?s perspective taken, I think we also want to ask about game theorists and all modelers, _What do these people believe themselves to be doing?_ In my experience (and I think the literature supports this, e.g., Chong 1995), they do _not_ understand themselves primarily in this way. Instead, they understand and defend what they do in Lakatosian (realist) terms, demanding of others: show me another theory that does better than _this_ theory in predicting the world. (And the best theory is conceptualized as parsimonious and formal; I once encountered a scholar so brow beaten by this attitude that he described what he did as _non-formal theory._) Of course, this particular formulation of theory gets us into all kinds of issues, some of which Ian Shapiro explores in his discussion of the problems with _theory-driven research._ Many years ago, as an asst prof, I remember discovering Glaser and Strauss' book on grounded theory in the library stacks and feeling very angry that such a possibility had not even been mentioned to me in grad school. So, a discussion of what constitutes theory and theorizing is worthwhile in opening up what we might mean by that term. Chong, Dennis. Rational Choice Theory?s Mysterious Rivals. In Friedman, Jeffrey, ed. The Rational Choice Controversy. New Haven: Yale University Press, 1995, pp. 37-57. Ian Shapiro, What?s Wrong with Political Science? In Problems and Methods in the Study of Politics. eds. Ian Shapiro, Rogers M. Smith, and Tarek E. Masoud, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2004, 19-41. Originally presented in 2001 as The Charles E. Lindblom Lecture in Public Policy, Institution for Social and Policy Studies, Yale University, February 14. Peri S-S -- Peregrine Schwartz-Shea Professor University of Utah Political Science Department 260 South Central Campus Drive Rm 252 Salt Lake City, UT 84112-9152 (801) 581-6300 phone mail psshea at poli-sci.utah.edu From auroville1976 at yahoo.co.uk Thu Mar 5 06:01:28 2009 From: auroville1976 at yahoo.co.uk (Aurogeeta Das) Date: Thu, 5 Mar 2009 11:01:28 +0000 (GMT) Subject: [Interpretationandmethods] Prismatic Message-ID: <769880.89906.qm@web24108.mail.ird.yahoo.com> Hi, In my thesis on southern Indian threshold drawings (which are now transitioning from a domestic and communal to a public space), I am trying to use the term 'prismatic' as a metaphor for a methodology by which a researcher clarifies a complex practice by looking at its various traditional and contemporary 'refractions'. I know 'prismatic' as a term is used in scientific research but I was wondering if anyone has come across the term with reference to research methodologies in the social sciences and humanities. Best, Aurogeeta From js11 at soas.ac.uk Thu Mar 5 06:16:10 2009 From: js11 at soas.ac.uk (Julia Strauss) Date: Thu, 5 Mar 2009 03:16:10 -0800 Subject: [Interpretationandmethods] Prismatic In-Reply-To: <769880.89906.qm@web24108.mail.ird.yahoo.com> References: <769880.89906.qm@web24108.mail.ird.yahoo.com> Message-ID: <7f2948f90903050316t63dba89ex358e696161bf42d@mail.gmail.com> Aurogeeta, This might be a bit tricky, because "prismatic society" was used by Fred Riggs in comparative politics/ development with respect to I think Thailand at the height of modernization theory in the 1960s as an attempt to get beyond a crude "tradition/ modernity" paradigm. (You'll have to forgive me, it has been over 20 years since I've had to look at this!) Probably the reason that the term didn't catch on was because while the ideas behind the term were sound, the language and the writing were incredibly convoluted and difficult to get through. Your core concerns and methods are quite different, but there might be enough overlap that it would probably be worth getting a copy of Riggs, and .. although it is hard going because Riggs is in effect trying to go beyond modernization theory while at the same time being very constrained by a lot of the preoccupations of modernization theory ... see what the differences are and where there might be some overlap. (Simply because when you're using the same term to mean something quite different, it pays to be careful)... Julia Strauss 2009/3/5 Aurogeeta Das > > Hi, > In my thesis on southern Indian threshold drawings (which are now > transitioning from a domestic and communal to a public space), I am trying > to use the term 'prismatic' as a metaphor for a methodology by which a > researcher clarifies a complex practice by looking at its various > traditional and contemporary 'refractions'. I know 'prismatic' as a term is > used in scientific research but I was wondering if anyone has come across > the term with reference to research methodologies in the social sciences and > humanities. > Best, Aurogeeta > > > > > > _______________________________________________ > Interpretationandmethods mailing list > Interpretationandmethods at listserv.cddc.vt.edu > http://listserv.cddc.vt.edu/mailman/listinfo/interpretationandmethods > -------------- next part -------------- An HTML attachment was scrubbed... URL: http://listserv.cddc.vt.edu/pipermail/interpretationandmethods/attachments/20090305/d0b5a41d/attachment.html From D.Yanow at fsw.vu.nl Thu Mar 5 06:35:46 2009 From: D.Yanow at fsw.vu.nl (Dvora Yanow) Date: Thu, 5 Mar 2009 12:35:46 +0100 Subject: [Interpretationandmethods] Prismatic References: <769880.89906.qm@web24108.mail.ird.yahoo.com> Message-ID: <5286BEEC21FADA47A24AA92D8BC9270E028A3A03@fswmail01.scw.vu.nl> An HTML attachment was scrubbed... URL: http://listserv.cddc.vt.edu/pipermail/interpretationandmethods/attachments/20090305/c48e7ee3/attachment.html From auroville1976 at yahoo.co.uk Thu Mar 5 06:56:04 2009 From: auroville1976 at yahoo.co.uk (Aurogeeta Das) Date: Thu, 5 Mar 2009 11:56:04 +0000 (GMT) Subject: [Interpretationandmethods] Prismatic In-Reply-To: <5286BEEC21FADA47A24AA92D8BC9270E028A3A03@fswmail01.scw.vu.nl> Message-ID: <691538.75238.qm@web24102.mail.ird.yahoo.com> Thank you for the reference, Julia. Will look into it. Dvora, by traditional 'refractions', I mean the myths and stories that mention the floor-drawing practice (many of them now remembered predominantly by temple priests and forgotten by the practitioners themselves); associated fertility rituals and ancestor-worship (both are reflected in the drawings); lyrics of songs sung during the fertility rituals, etc. Among the contemporary refractions, I refer to chapbooks that women learn from increasingly, exercise notebooks the women practice in, discourses that circulate among the women themselves as well as in the media (including a practice of publishing new 'designs' with contributors' photos beside the drawings + revivalist articles), blockbuster films that feature the drawing practice prominently, competitions organised locally and at state-level, stickers and stencils available in the bazaar for women too busy or not skilled enough in drawing, and of course the contemporary practice of drawing itself. I don't think any of these 'refractions' (one might also call them framing devices) by themselves present a complete picture of the richness of the practice. However, by studying each of these, I am trying to build a composite picture of a transitioning practice where the practitioners' memory of its origins and developments is partial. Hope that clarifies my question. Best, Aurogeeta --- On Thu, 5/3/09, Dvora Yanow wrote: > From: Dvora Yanow > Subject: Re: [Interpretationandmethods] Prismatic > To: "interpretation and methods group" > Date: Thursday, 5 March, 2009, 5:05 PM > RE: Prismatic Hi > Aurogeeta, > Sounds interesting -- but I'm not quite getting the > idea. > How do you mean refractions?? the historical or > traditional and contemp. 'trails' the practice has > left behind it?? its half-life, so to speak? > Dvora Yanow From patrickthaddeusjackson at gmail.com Thu Mar 5 19:03:45 2009 From: patrickthaddeusjackson at gmail.com (Patrick Thaddeus Jackson) Date: Thu, 5 Mar 2009 19:03:45 -0500 Subject: [Interpretationandmethods] Prismatic In-Reply-To: <691538.75238.qm@web24102.mail.ird.yahoo.com> References: <691538.75238.qm@web24102.mail.ird.yahoo.com> Message-ID: <84356FCB-8768-48D9-B896-87AFDA52227D@gmail.com> Not to be pedantic, but to me what you are calling "refractions" look like pieces of observational data. You then propose to assemble a composite picture of the practice in all of its multiplicity and ambiguity out of those pieces of data. Sounds good to me -- why use the neologism? PTJ On Mar 5, 2009, at 6:56 AM, Aurogeeta Das wrote: > > Thank you for the reference, Julia. Will look into it. > > Dvora, by traditional 'refractions', I mean the myths and stories > that mention the floor-drawing practice (many of them now remembered > predominantly by temple priests and forgotten by the practitioners > themselves); associated fertility rituals and ancestor-worship (both > are reflected in the drawings); lyrics of songs sung during the > fertility rituals, etc. > > Among the contemporary refractions, I refer to chapbooks that women > learn from increasingly, exercise notebooks the women practice in, > discourses that circulate among the women themselves as well as in > the media (including a practice of publishing new 'designs' with > contributors' photos beside the drawings + revivalist articles), > blockbuster films that feature the drawing practice prominently, > competitions organised locally and at state-level, stickers and > stencils available in the bazaar for women too busy or not skilled > enough in drawing, and of course the contemporary practice of > drawing itself. > > I don't think any of these 'refractions' (one might also call them > framing devices) by themselves present a complete picture of the > richness of the practice. However, by studying each of these, I am > trying to build a composite picture of a transitioning practice > where the practitioners' memory of its origins and developments is > partial. Hope that clarifies my question. > > Best, Aurogeeta > === Patrick Thaddeus Jackson Director of General Education, American University Editor-in-Chief, Journal of International Relations and Development http://profptj.blogspot.com | http://www.kittenboo.com calendar: http://ical.mac.com/onyxdr/Patrick From swarts at andromeda.rutgers.edu Thu Mar 5 20:12:08 2009 From: swarts at andromeda.rutgers.edu (swarts at andromeda.rutgers.edu) Date: Thu, 5 Mar 2009 20:12:08 -0500 (EST) Subject: [Interpretationandmethods] Prismatic Message-ID: <532271cd54983f796b11cc456c5dba36.squirrel@webmail.newark.rutgers.edu> I heartily agree with Patrick. What he politely calls a "neologism" may seem like new jargon. "Refractions" doesn't seem like a particularly helpful metaphor for "cultural practices" A refraction is a "deflection from a straight path undergone by a light ray or energy wave in passing obliquely from one medium (as air) into another (as glass) in which its velocity is different." (Webster's.) You seem to be making a point that these bits of material culture are refracted in another direction from the original myths and stories, i.e. they undergo a change - or the people who PRODUCE them make them different from the original, and only partly remember the original. But I still think it's confusing for you to use "refractions" because the reader is required to translate it, as in "oh, she means the cultural products these modern women produce." Why not discuss your metaphor in an early theoretical chapter, reflecting on how these cultural products are variations on earlier ones. (Though what isn't? Who DOES fully remember the origins of their cultural practices?) I say stick to the data, which includes what the women remember and don't remember, which is interesting. Heidi Swarts Rutgers University-Newark > Not to be pedantic, but to me what you are calling "refractions" look like pieces of observational data. You then propose to assemble a composite picture of the practice in all of its multiplicity and ambiguity out of those pieces of data. Sounds good to me -- why use the neologism? > > PTJ > > On Mar 5, 2009, at 6:56 AM, Aurogeeta Das wrote: > >> Thank you for the reference, Julia. Will look into it. >> Dvora, by traditional 'refractions', I mean the myths and stories that mention the floor-drawing practice (many of them now remembered predominantly by temple priests and forgotten by the practitioners themselves); associated fertility rituals and ancestor-worship (both are reflected in the drawings); lyrics of songs sung during the fertility rituals, etc. >> Among the contemporary refractions, I refer to chapbooks that women learn from increasingly, exercise notebooks the women practice in, discourses that circulate among the women themselves as well as in the media (including a practice of publishing new 'designs' with contributors' photos beside the drawings + revivalist articles), blockbuster films that feature the drawing practice prominently, competitions organised locally and at state-level, stickers and stencils available in the bazaar for women too busy or not skilled enough in drawing, and of course the contemporary practice of >> drawing itself. >> I don't think any of these 'refractions' (one might also call them framing devices) by themselves present a complete picture of the richness of the practice. However, by studying each of these, I am trying to build a composite picture of a transitioning practice where the practitioners' memory of its origins and developments is partial. Hope that clarifies my question. >> Best, Aurogeeta > > === > Patrick Thaddeus Jackson > Director of General Education, American University > Editor-in-Chief, Journal of International Relations and Development http://profptj.blogspot.com | http://www.kittenboo.com > calendar: http://ical.mac.com/onyxdr/Patrick > > _______________________________________________ > Interpretationandmethods mailing list > Interpretationandmethods at listserv.cddc.vt.edu > http://listserv.cddc.vt.edu/mailman/listinfo/interpretationandmethods > Heidi Swarts, Ph.D. Assistant Professor Political Science Rutgers University-Newark Hill Hall Room 727 360 Dr. Martin Luther King Jr. Blvd. Newark, NJ 07102-1801 tel. 973-353-5988 fax 973-353-5103 swarts at andromeda.rutgers.edu From D.Yanow at fsw.vu.nl Sat Mar 7 10:10:32 2009 From: D.Yanow at fsw.vu.nl (Dvora Yanow) Date: Sat, 7 Mar 2009 16:10:32 +0100 Subject: [Interpretationandmethods] Prismatic References: <532271cd54983f796b11cc456c5dba36.squirrel@webmail.newark.rutgers.edu> Message-ID: <5286BEEC21FADA47A24AA92D8BC9270E028A3A5B@fswmail01.scw.vu.nl> An HTML attachment was scrubbed... URL: http://listserv.cddc.vt.edu/pipermail/interpretationandmethods/attachments/20090307/c717daa0/attachment.html From larchap at earthlink.net Sat Mar 7 10:56:46 2009 From: larchap at earthlink.net (Larry Chappell) Date: Sat, 7 Mar 2009 10:56:46 -0500 (EST) Subject: [Interpretationandmethods] Refraction Message-ID: <21692936.1236441406468.JavaMail.root@elwamui-norfolk.atl.sa.earthlink.net> An HTML attachment was scrubbed... URL: http://listserv.cddc.vt.edu/pipermail/interpretationandmethods/attachments/20090307/efb9b2e3/attachment-0001.html From D.Yanow at fsw.vu.nl Sat Mar 7 11:25:58 2009 From: D.Yanow at fsw.vu.nl (Dvora Yanow) Date: Sat, 7 Mar 2009 17:25:58 +0100 Subject: [Interpretationandmethods] Refraction References: <21692936.1236441406468.JavaMail.root@elwamui-norfolk.atl.sa.earthlink.net> Message-ID: <5286BEEC21FADA47A24AA92D8BC9270E028A3A5E@fswmail01.scw.vu.nl> An HTML attachment was scrubbed... URL: http://listserv.cddc.vt.edu/pipermail/interpretationandmethods/attachments/20090307/47ae7bf1/attachment.html From auroville1976 at yahoo.co.uk Sat Mar 7 16:25:44 2009 From: auroville1976 at yahoo.co.uk (Aurogeeta Das) Date: Sat, 7 Mar 2009 21:25:44 +0000 (GMT) Subject: [Interpretationandmethods] Prismatic In-Reply-To: <5286BEEC21FADA47A24AA92D8BC9270E028A3A5B@fswmail01.scw.vu.nl> Message-ID: <749315.79875.qm@web24103.mail.ird.yahoo.com> Thank you for your comments, Patrick, Heidi and Dvora. I did come up with one result when I googled prismatic and got Prismatic Metropolis: Inequality in Los Angeles, Edited by Lawrence D. Bobo et al. However, I haven't found out yet exactly in what way the term prismatic was used in the book. Also, I did mean prismatic very much as a metaphor. One of the reasons I felt compelled to come up with a neologism, as Patrick puts it, is because there was some criticism of my having so many (diverse) pieces of observational data, particularly that I was looking at various media, and my point was exactly what Dvora has pointed out below, i.e. that none of these suggest the practice as it is. You can arrive at a holistic picture only by looking at its various facets. I guess what I need to articulate to myself is what you have pointed out, Dvora, what - in my case, becomes the metaphor for light? Perhaps the following may be useful in clarifying further. It was my first rough draft for my thoughts on prismatic, so excuse my own mixed metaphors as well! Note the figurative meaning... "Although the word ?prismatic? has been used with reference to research methods in the context of scientific studies, what I mean by prismatic differs, though it also derives from the root, ?prism?. A prism being defined as a triangular or rectilinear glass object, ?with refracting surfaces at an acute angle with each other, and that separates white light into a spectrum of colours?, used figuratively with reference to ?clarification or distortion by a particular viewpoint?, I use the term ?prismatic? to describe a method by which a researcher clarifies a complex practice by looking at its various refractions; and by understanding those refractions, makes sense of the prism itself, which indeed may have multiple facets and angles at variance with each other. Furthermore, while the prism may appear to reflect white light, in reality this light is composed of myriad colours. Similarly, while a practice may seem relatively straightforward to interpret, it may actually consist of multiple facets ? bits of prismatic light. The word ?light? is also appropriate in this context, when one remembers that one of its metaphors is understanding." However, this is something I am still in the process of trying to articulate. What I am trying to convey is particularly the incredible multifaceted quality of this practice and how each of the facets appears to need its own semiotic interpretation, if that makes any sense... --- On Sat, 7/3/09, Dvora Yanow wrote: > From: Dvora Yanow > Subject: Re: [Interpretationandmethods] Prismatic > To: "interpretation and methods group" > Date: Saturday, 7 March, 2009, 8:40 PM >
"-//W3C//DTD HTML 3.2//EN"> > > > > > RE: [Interpretationandmethods] > Prismatic > > > > >

I've been > cogitating over this and the challenges/queries from Profs. > Swarts and Jackson.
>
> One might well ask about the utility of a neologism -- I > didn't fully grasp the idea, either, when it the > question was first posted.? But it seems to me to be > more useful to explore it as a metaphor -- in which case, > one asks what its 'source' origins are, its > entailments there, and its implications for its target (at > least, taking cognitive linguistics and generative metaphor > approaches to metaphor as sketched out by Lakoff, Lakoff and > Johnson, and Schon) -- than to dismiss it immediately as > jargon.? After all, a lot of the terms introduced into > a field -- whether analytic or methodological, to the extent > that these can be separated -- are new, or > 'new-isms':? reshapings of existing > terms.
>
> >From a metaphor analysis perspective, one would want to > play around with the term for a bit to see what it yields, > generatively, and what it blinds, in terms of the intended > 'target.'
>
> As I've thought about this since Aurogeeta explained a > bit more, I've gotten the picture of a present practice > that has a rich history, but no single practitioner is aware > of all of these bits of historical > background.?
>
> So in this sense, Patrick, it may yield a different > understanding of the development of practices from a kind of > observational one in which an ethnographer, e.g., can simply > make a bigger whole out of all the parts -- because, in my > limited understanding -- all those parts are not > simultaneously available or rendered available (as that word > is intended in ethnomethodology, or in Heideggerian/Dreyfus > & Dreyfus treatments of 'practice'); I'm > missing the right word for what I'm trying to say, but > by 'simultaneous' I'm thinking of at the same > moment in the same place.?
>
> And so, one refracts the contemporary practice to find the > threads [pardon the mixed metaphor] that constitute it > today.? Some of these are historical, existing in > songs, oral 'texts', etc.; some are known today, but > only by priests; and then there is the practice as it > currently enacted -- and what bits can one find there?? > I.e., Patrick's description is of an observer findings > parts and then assembling them into a whole; Aurogeeta seems > to be wanting to go in the opposite direction -- from the > practice 'whole' to its constituent elements, which > are not visible in the whole unless one refracts it [ok, > Aurogeeta, so what do you need to pass through the prism in > order to see these?? i.e., what's analogous to > light in your case -- your analytic vision?? or > something else?].
>
> Metaphor-play would also ask us to consider what's not > captured in this way of seeing/knowing.? Palimpsest > came to mind as an alternative; but that has radically > different methodological implications -- there is present > and past, each singular [ok, maybe there's a third image > buried below #2], and the implication is that all one has to > do is scrape away the top layer and the 2nd will > self-reveal.
>
> I would rather encourage you, Aurogeeta, to play out your > metaphor, analytically, to see if it expresses what > you're trying to, in the spirit that metaphors often > give voice to things we know tacitly (as in being > "models of" prior thinking).? See what this > one helps you say about your field data -- and, importantly, > what it silences --? and decide if it's useful to > you in doing that or if another one is better.
>
> So far, other than Julia's reference to the earlier > work, it seems that none of us has encountered it in this > kind of use (and I assume you have also googled > it).
>
> Dvora Yanow
>
> -----Original Message-----
> From: interpretationandmethods-bounces at malagigi.cddc.vt.edu > on behalf of swarts at andromeda.rutgers.edu
> Sent: Fri 06-Mar-09 02:12
> To: interpretation and methods group
> Subject: Re: [Interpretationandmethods] Prismatic
>
> I heartily agree with Patrick. What he politely calls a > "neologism" may
> seem like new jargon. "Refractions" doesn't > seem like a particularly
> helpful metaphor for "cultural practices" A > refraction is a "deflection
> from a straight path undergone by a light ray or energy > wave in passing
> obliquely from one medium (as air) into another (as glass) > in which its
> velocity is different." (Webster's.) You seem to > be making a point that
> these bits of material culture are refracted in another > direction from the
> original myths and stories, i.e. they undergo a change - or > the people who
> PRODUCE them make them different from the original, and > only partly
> remember the original. But I still think it's confusing > for you to use
> "refractions" because the reader is required to > translate it, as in "oh,
> she means the cultural products these modern women > produce." Why not
> discuss your metaphor in an early theoretical chapter, > reflecting on how
> these cultural products are variations on earlier ones. > (Though what
> isn't? Who DOES fully remember the origins of their > cultural practices?)
> I say stick to the data, which includes what the women > remember and don't
> remember, which is interesting.
> Heidi Swarts
> Rutgers University-Newark
>
> > Not to be pedantic, but to me what you are calling > "refractions" look
> like pieces of observational data. You then propose to > assemble a
> composite picture of the practice in all of its > multiplicity and
> ambiguity out of those pieces of data. Sounds good to me -- > why use the
> neologism?
> >
> > PTJ
> >
> > On Mar 5, 2009, at 6:56 AM, Aurogeeta Das > wrote:
> >
> >> Thank you for the reference, Julia. Will look into > it.
> >> Dvora, by traditional 'refractions', I > mean the myths and stories that
> mention the floor-drawing practice (many of them now > remembered
> predominantly by temple priests and forgotten by the > practitioners
> themselves); associated fertility rituals and > ancestor-worship (both
> are reflected in the drawings); lyrics of songs sung during > the
> fertility rituals, etc.
> >> Among the contemporary refractions, I refer to > chapbooks that women
> learn from increasingly, exercise notebooks the women > practice in,
> discourses that circulate among the women themselves as > well as in the
> media (including a practice of publishing new > 'designs' with
> contributors' photos beside the drawings + revivalist > articles),
> blockbuster films that feature the drawing practice > prominently,
> competitions organised locally and at state-level, stickers > and
> stencils available in the bazaar for women too busy or not > skilled
> enough in drawing, and of course the contemporary practice > of
> >> drawing itself.
> >> I don't think any of these > 'refractions' (one might also call them
> framing devices) by themselves present a complete picture > of the
> richness of the practice. However, by studying each of > these, I am
> trying to build a composite picture of a transitioning > practice where
> the practitioners' memory of its origins and > developments is partial.
> Hope that clarifies my question.
> >> Best, Aurogeeta
> >
> > ===
> > Patrick Thaddeus Jackson
> > Director of General Education, American > University
> > Editor-in-Chief, Journal of International Relations > and Development
> HREF="http://profptj.blogspot.com">http://profptj.blogspot.com > | HREF="http://www.kittenboo.com">http://www.kittenboo.com
> > calendar: target="_blank" > HREF="http://ical.mac.com/onyxdr/Patrick">http://ical.mac.com/onyxdr/Patrick
> >
> > > _______________________________________________
> > Interpretationandmethods mailing list
> > > Interpretationandmethods at listserv.cddc.vt.edu
> > target="_blank" > HREF="http://listserv.cddc.vt.edu/mailman/listinfo/interpretationandmethods">http://listserv.cddc.vt.edu/mailman/listinfo/interpretationandmethods
> >
>
>
> Heidi Swarts, Ph.D.
> Assistant Professor
> Political Science
> Rutgers University-Newark
> Hill Hall Room 727
> 360 Dr. Martin Luther King Jr. Blvd.
> Newark, NJ 07102-1801
> tel. 973-353-5988
> fax 973-353-5103
> swarts at andromeda.rutgers.edu
>
>
>
>
> _______________________________________________
> Interpretationandmethods mailing list
> Interpretationandmethods at listserv.cddc.vt.edu
> HREF="http://listserv.cddc.vt.edu/mailman/listinfo/interpretationandmethods">http://listserv.cddc.vt.edu/mailman/listinfo/interpretationandmethods
>
> >

> > > >
_______________________________________________ > Interpretationandmethods mailing list > Interpretationandmethods at listserv.cddc.vt.edu > http://listserv.cddc.vt.edu/mailman/listinfo/interpretationandmethods From swarts at andromeda.rutgers.edu Sat Mar 7 16:59:59 2009 From: swarts at andromeda.rutgers.edu (swarts at andromeda.rutgers.edu) Date: Sat, 7 Mar 2009 16:59:59 -0500 (EST) Subject: [Interpretationandmethods] Prismatic In-Reply-To: <749315.79875.qm@web24103.mail.ird.yahoo.com> References: <749315.79875.qm@web24103.mail.ird.yahoo.com> Message-ID: I liked your quoted section a lot, defining "prism" and relating it to "facets," "light," and "refractions" as pieces of a whole that cannot capture it. Really explicating the metaphor is quite helpful, I think. I can see why you would want to use it given the useful background you gave, of getting "some criticism of my having so many (diverse) pieces of > observational data, particularly that I was looking at various media" - it's hard for me to understand why that a rich multiplicity of data, as long as you can relate it to your topic, would evoke criticism. Heidi Swarts > > Thank you for your comments, Patrick, Heidi and Dvora. I did come up with > one result when I googled prismatic and got Prismatic Metropolis: > Inequality in Los Angeles, Edited by Lawrence D. Bobo et al. However, I > haven't found out yet exactly in what way the term prismatic was used in > the book. > > Also, I did mean prismatic very much as a metaphor. One of the reasons I > felt compelled to come up with a neologism, as Patrick puts it, is because > there was some criticism of my having so many (diverse) pieces of > observational data, particularly that I was looking at various media, and > my point was exactly what Dvora has pointed out below, i.e. that none of > these suggest the practice as it is. You can arrive at a holistic picture > only by looking at its various facets. I guess what I need to articulate > to myself is what you have pointed out, Dvora, what - in my case, becomes > the metaphor for light? Perhaps the following may be useful in clarifying > further. It was my first rough draft for my thoughts on prismatic, so > excuse my own mixed metaphors as well! Note the figurative meaning... > > "Although the word ???prismatic??? has been used with reference to > research methods in the context of scientific studies, what I mean by > prismatic differs, though it also derives from the root, ???prism???. A > prism being defined as a triangular or rectilinear glass object, ???with > refracting surfaces at an acute angle with each other, and that separates > white light into a spectrum of colours???, used figuratively with > reference to ???clarification or distortion by a particular viewpoint???, > I use the term ???prismatic??? to describe a method by which a researcher > clarifies a complex practice by looking at its various refractions; and by > understanding those refractions, makes sense of the prism itself, which > indeed may have multiple facets and angles at variance with each other. > Furthermore, while the prism may appear to reflect white light, in reality > this light is composed of myriad colours. Similarly, while a practice may > seem relatively > straightforward to interpret, it may actually consist of multiple facets > ??? bits of prismatic light. The word ???light??? is also appropriate in > this context, when one remembers that one of its metaphors is > understanding." > > However, this is something I am still in the process of trying to > articulate. What I am trying to convey is particularly the incredible > multifaceted quality of this practice and how each of the facets appears > to need its own semiotic interpretation, if that makes any sense... > > --- On Sat, 7/3/09, Dvora Yanow wrote: > >> From: Dvora Yanow >> Subject: Re: [Interpretationandmethods] Prismatic >> To: "interpretation and methods group" >> >> Date: Saturday, 7 March, 2009, 8:40 PM >>
> "-//W3C//DTD HTML 3.2//EN"> >> >> >> >> >> RE: [Interpretationandmethods] >> Prismatic >> >> >> >> >>

I've been >> cogitating over this and the challenges/queries from Profs. >> Swarts and Jackson.
>>
>> One might well ask about the utility of a neologism -- I >> didn't fully grasp the idea, either, when it the >> question was first posted.?? But it seems to me to be >> more useful to explore it as a metaphor -- in which case, >> one asks what its 'source' origins are, its >> entailments there, and its implications for its target (at >> least, taking cognitive linguistics and generative metaphor >> approaches to metaphor as sketched out by Lakoff, Lakoff and >> Johnson, and Schon) -- than to dismiss it immediately as >> jargon.?? After all, a lot of the terms introduced into >> a field -- whether analytic or methodological, to the extent >> that these can be separated -- are new, or >> 'new-isms':?? reshapings of existing >> terms.
>>
>> >From a metaphor analysis perspective, one would want to >> play around with the term for a bit to see what it yields, >> generatively, and what it blinds, in terms of the intended >> 'target.'
>>
>> As I've thought about this since Aurogeeta explained a >> bit more, I've gotten the picture of a present practice >> that has a rich history, but no single practitioner is aware >> of all of these bits of historical >> background.??
>>
>> So in this sense, Patrick, it may yield a different >> understanding of the development of practices from a kind of >> observational one in which an ethnographer, e.g., can simply >> make a bigger whole out of all the parts -- because, in my >> limited understanding -- all those parts are not >> simultaneously available or rendered available (as that word >> is intended in ethnomethodology, or in Heideggerian/Dreyfus >> & Dreyfus treatments of 'practice'); I'm >> missing the right word for what I'm trying to say, but >> by 'simultaneous' I'm thinking of at the same >> moment in the same place.??
>>
>> And so, one refracts the contemporary practice to find the >> threads [pardon the mixed metaphor] that constitute it >> today.?? Some of these are historical, existing in >> songs, oral 'texts', etc.; some are known today, but >> only by priests; and then there is the practice as it >> currently enacted -- and what bits can one find there??? >> I.e., Patrick's description is of an observer findings >> parts and then assembling them into a whole; Aurogeeta seems >> to be wanting to go in the opposite direction -- from the >> practice 'whole' to its constituent elements, which >> are not visible in the whole unless one refracts it [ok, >> Aurogeeta, so what do you need to pass through the prism in >> order to see these??? i.e., what's analogous to >> light in your case -- your analytic vision??? or >> something else?].
>>
>> Metaphor-play would also ask us to consider what's not >> captured in this way of seeing/knowing.?? Palimpsest >> came to mind as an alternative; but that has radically >> different methodological implications -- there is present >> and past, each singular [ok, maybe there's a third image >> buried below #2], and the implication is that all one has to >> do is scrape away the top layer and the 2nd will >> self-reveal.
>>
>> I would rather encourage you, Aurogeeta, to play out your >> metaphor, analytically, to see if it expresses what >> you're trying to, in the spirit that metaphors often >> give voice to things we know tacitly (as in being >> "models of" prior thinking).?? See what this >> one helps you say about your field data -- and, importantly, >> what it silences --?? and decide if it's useful to >> you in doing that or if another one is better.
>>
>> So far, other than Julia's reference to the earlier >> work, it seems that none of us has encountered it in this >> kind of use (and I assume you have also googled >> it).
>>
>> Dvora Yanow
>>
>> -----Original Message-----
>> From: interpretationandmethods-bounces at malagigi.cddc.vt.edu >> on behalf of swarts at andromeda.rutgers.edu
>> Sent: Fri 06-Mar-09 02:12
>> To: interpretation and methods group
>> Subject: Re: [Interpretationandmethods] Prismatic
>>
>> I heartily agree with Patrick. What he politely calls a >> "neologism" may
>> seem like new jargon. "Refractions" doesn't >> seem like a particularly
>> helpful metaphor for "cultural practices" A >> refraction is a "deflection
>> from a straight path undergone by a light ray or energy >> wave in passing
>> obliquely from one medium (as air) into another (as glass) >> in which its
>> velocity is different." (Webster's.) You seem to >> be making a point that
>> these bits of material culture are refracted in another >> direction from the
>> original myths and stories, i.e. they undergo a change - or >> the people who
>> PRODUCE them make them different from the original, and >> only partly
>> remember the original. But I still think it's confusing >> for you to use
>> "refractions" because the reader is required to >> translate it, as in "oh,
>> she means the cultural products these modern women >> produce." Why not
>> discuss your metaphor in an early theoretical chapter, >> reflecting on how
>> these cultural products are variations on earlier ones. >> (Though what
>> isn't? Who DOES fully remember the origins of their >> cultural practices?)
>> I say stick to the data, which includes what the women >> remember and don't
>> remember, which is interesting.
>> Heidi Swarts
>> Rutgers University-Newark
>>
>> > Not to be pedantic, but to me what you are calling >> "refractions" look
>> like pieces of observational data. You then propose to >> assemble a
>> composite picture of the practice in all of its >> multiplicity and
>> ambiguity out of those pieces of data. Sounds good to me -- >> why use the
>> neologism?
>> >
>> > PTJ
>> >
>> > On Mar 5, 2009, at 6:56 AM, Aurogeeta Das >> wrote:
>> >
>> >> Thank you for the reference, Julia. Will look into >> it.
>> >> Dvora, by traditional 'refractions', I >> mean the myths and stories that
>> mention the floor-drawing practice (many of them now >> remembered
>> predominantly by temple priests and forgotten by the >> practitioners
>> themselves); associated fertility rituals and >> ancestor-worship (both
>> are reflected in the drawings); lyrics of songs sung during >> the
>> fertility rituals, etc.
>> >> Among the contemporary refractions, I refer to >> chapbooks that women
>> learn from increasingly, exercise notebooks the women >> practice in,
>> discourses that circulate among the women themselves as >> well as in the
>> media (including a practice of publishing new >> 'designs' with
>> contributors' photos beside the drawings + revivalist >> articles),
>> blockbuster films that feature the drawing practice >> prominently,
>> competitions organised locally and at state-level, stickers >> and
>> stencils available in the bazaar for women too busy or not >> skilled
>> enough in drawing, and of course the contemporary practice >> of
>> >> drawing itself.
>> >> I don't think any of these >> 'refractions' (one might also call them
>> framing devices) by themselves present a complete picture >> of the
>> richness of the practice. However, by studying each of >> these, I am
>> trying to build a composite picture of a transitioning >> practice where
>> the practitioners' memory of its origins and >> developments is partial.
>> Hope that clarifies my question.
>> >> Best, Aurogeeta
>> >
>> > ===
>> > Patrick Thaddeus Jackson
>> > Director of General Education, American >> University
>> > Editor-in-Chief, Journal of International Relations >> and Development
>> > HREF="http://profptj.blogspot.com">http://profptj.blogspot.com >> | > HREF="http://www.kittenboo.com">http://www.kittenboo.com
>> > calendar: > target="_blank" >> HREF="http://ical.mac.com/onyxdr/Patrick">http://ical.mac.com/onyxdr/Patrick
>> >
>> > >> _______________________________________________
>> > Interpretationandmethods mailing list
>> > >> Interpretationandmethods at listserv.cddc.vt.edu
>> > > target="_blank" >> HREF="http://listserv.cddc.vt.edu/mailman/listinfo/interpretationandmethods">http://listserv.cddc.vt.edu/mailman/listinfo/interpretationandmethods
>> >
>>
>>
>> Heidi Swarts, Ph.D.
>> Assistant Professor
>> Political Science
>> Rutgers University-Newark
>> Hill Hall Room 727
>> 360 Dr. Martin Luther King Jr. Blvd.
>> Newark, NJ 07102-1801
>> tel. 973-353-5988
>> fax 973-353-5103
>> swarts at andromeda.rutgers.edu
>>
>>
>>
>>
>> _______________________________________________
>> Interpretationandmethods mailing list
>> Interpretationandmethods at listserv.cddc.vt.edu
>> > HREF="http://listserv.cddc.vt.edu/mailman/listinfo/interpretationandmethods">http://listserv.cddc.vt.edu/mailman/listinfo/interpretationandmethods
>>
>> >>

>> >> >> >>
_______________________________________________ >> Interpretationandmethods mailing list >> Interpretationandmethods at listserv.cddc.vt.edu >> http://listserv.cddc.vt.edu/mailman/listinfo/interpretationandmethods > > > > _______________________________________________ > Interpretationandmethods mailing list > Interpretationandmethods at listserv.cddc.vt.edu > http://listserv.cddc.vt.edu/mailman/listinfo/interpretationandmethods > Heidi Swarts, Ph.D. Assistant Professor Political Science Rutgers University-Newark Hill Hall Room 727 360 Dr. Martin Luther King Jr. Blvd. Newark, NJ 07102-1801 tel. 973-353-5988 fax 973-353-5103 swarts at andromeda.rutgers.edu From patrickthaddeusjackson at gmail.com Sun Mar 8 09:38:23 2009 From: patrickthaddeusjackson at gmail.com (Patrick Thaddeus Jackson) Date: Sun, 8 Mar 2009 09:38:23 -0400 Subject: [Interpretationandmethods] Prismatic In-Reply-To: <749315.79875.qm@web24103.mail.ird.yahoo.com> References: <749315.79875.qm@web24103.mail.ird.yahoo.com> Message-ID: <3F174AE9-718D-4D25-9184-DE058BCC057A@gmail.com> Aurogeeta: Reading over your very evocative description two things occur to me: 1) to make the metaphorical logic work, I would say that the equivalence is practice = prism, not method = prism. You seem to be saying that we as researchers only have access to bits of refracted light, and that you intend to examine those refracted bits and then work backwards -- abductively, perhaps? -- to reconstruct the prism which produced them. Your approach isn't prismatic; the phenomenon is prismatic, and you are then approaching it in a reconstructive way. 2) it seems to me that you then have to clarify the epistemic status of the "prism" that you (re)construct. Abduction is prized as a technique both by critical realists, for whom it yields real-but- ultimately-unobservable objects of knowledge that produce observable causal effects, and pragmatists, who in common with other analyticists remain skeptical that such intellectual constructs are anything more than useful abstractions. The reason that this is important is that it affects the way that you will draw on your data in order to produce the (re)construction in the first place, and in particular whether you are going to try to subsume all of these manifestations under a single explanatory category or not. When you say things like "each of the facets appears to need its own semiotic interpretation" that sounds quite pragmatic, but then I wonder what the conceptual function of referring to "a" practice is in the first place. To put this another way: I am unclear what a "holistic picture" is and how one might produce one. If we're speaking of physical prisms, a holistic picture means the entire apparatus of contemporary optical theory plus some specific data about the particular prism and the quality of the light that passes into it, but that likely implies both the existence of the prism as a separate object to be discovered rather than ethnographically co-produced and the existence of a set of global theories about the refraction of -- I would assume -- the flow of social action by "prismatic" practices. I am unsure that you want to go there, since such a perspective suggests the presence of deeper unities behind apparent multiplicities, in tension with your stated desire to preserve the facets of the practice in their individuality. By all means, use the metaphor if it helps you in your work (I'm a pragmatist about these things). But my advice would be to be very clear about the logic and the value-presuppositions of whatever metaphor one uses (that's my Weberian streak). And for my own part I would also add: don't confuse a statement of scientific ontology (what hinds of things exist and how they exist) with a statement of philosophical ontology (how observers are hooked up to the world and how they produce knowledge). "Prismatic" seems to me to be the former, not the latter; as for methodology, you look to me to be engaging in the sort of (re)construction that is either realist or pragmatist, and I don't see anything prismatic about that in particular. PTJ On Mar 7, 2009, at 4:25 PM, Aurogeeta Das wrote: > Thank you for your comments, Patrick, Heidi and Dvora. I did come up > with one result when I googled prismatic and got Prismatic > Metropolis: Inequality in Los Angeles, Edited by Lawrence D. Bobo et > al. However, I haven't found out yet exactly in what way the term > prismatic was used in the book. > > Also, I did mean prismatic very much as a metaphor. One of the > reasons I felt compelled to come up with a neologism, as Patrick > puts it, is because there was some criticism of my having so many > (diverse) pieces of observational data, particularly that I was > looking at various media, and my point was exactly what Dvora has > pointed out below, i.e. that none of these suggest the practice as > it is. You can arrive at a holistic picture only by looking at its > various facets. I guess what I need to articulate to myself is what > you have pointed out, Dvora, what - in my case, becomes the metaphor > for light? Perhaps the following may be useful in clarifying > further. It was my first rough draft for my thoughts on prismatic, > so excuse my own mixed metaphors as well! Note the figurative > meaning... > > "Although the word ?prismatic? has been used with reference to > research methods in the context of scientific studies, what I mean > by prismatic differs, though it also derives from the root, ?prism?. > A prism being defined as a triangular or rectilinear glass object, > ?with refracting surfaces at an acute angle with each other, and > that separates white light into a spectrum of colours?, used > figuratively with reference to ?clarification or distortion by a > particular viewpoint?, I use the term ?prismatic? to describe a > method by which a researcher clarifies a complex practice by looking > at its various refractions; and by understanding those refractions, > makes sense of the prism itself, which indeed may have multiple > facets and angles at variance with each other. Furthermore, while > the prism may appear to reflect white light, in reality this light > is composed of myriad colours. Similarly, while a practice may seem > relatively > straightforward to interpret, it may actually consist of multiple > facets ? bits of prismatic light. The word ?light? is also > appropriate in this context, when one remembers that one of its > metaphors is understanding." > > However, this is something I am still in the process of trying to > articulate. What I am trying to convey is particularly the > incredible multifaceted quality of this practice and how each of the > facets appears to need its own semiotic interpretation, if that > makes any sense... === Patrick Thaddeus Jackson Director of General Education, American University Editor-in-Chief, Journal of International Relations and Development http://www.kittenboo.com | http://duckofminerva.blogspot.com calendar: http://ical.mac.com/onyxdr/Patrick From auroville1976 at yahoo.co.uk Sun Mar 8 10:06:51 2009 From: auroville1976 at yahoo.co.uk (Aurogeeta Das) Date: Sun, 8 Mar 2009 14:06:51 +0000 (GMT) Subject: [Interpretationandmethods] Prismatic In-Reply-To: <3F174AE9-718D-4D25-9184-DE058BCC057A@gmail.com> Message-ID: <615483.94962.qm@web24105.mail.ird.yahoo.com> Patrick, Still to digest all that you have said below, but my first response to this would be that yes, reading my own text, it is clear that I have in once instance stated that I intend using prismatic as a metaphor for methodology and later on, I describe the practice itself as a prism, so yes, I think the practice is like a prism but am not sure my approach is. Will have to think further on your comments about pragmatist and realist approaches. Best, Aurogeeta --- On Sun, 8/3/09, Patrick Thaddeus Jackson wrote: > From: Patrick Thaddeus Jackson > Subject: Re: [Interpretationandmethods] Prismatic > To: "interpretation and methods group" > Date: Sunday, 8 March, 2009, 7:08 PM > Aurogeeta: > > Reading over your very evocative description two things > occur to me: > > 1) to make the metaphorical logic work, I would say that > the > equivalence is practice = prism, not method = prism. You > seem to be > saying that we as researchers only have access to bits of > refracted > light, and that you intend to examine those refracted bits > and then > work backwards -- abductively, perhaps? -- to reconstruct > the prism > which produced them. Your approach isn't prismatic; the > phenomenon is > prismatic, and you are then approaching it in a > reconstructive way. > > 2) it seems to me that you then have to clarify the > epistemic status > of the "prism" that you (re)construct. Abduction > is prized as a > technique both by critical realists, for whom it yields > real-but- > ultimately-unobservable objects of knowledge that produce > observable > causal effects, and pragmatists, who in common with other > analyticists > remain skeptical that such intellectual constructs are > anything more > than useful abstractions. The reason that this is important > is that it > affects the way that you will draw on your data in order to > produce > the (re)construction in the first place, and in particular > whether you > are going to try to subsume all of these manifestations > under a single > explanatory category or not. When you say things like > "each of the > facets appears to need its own semiotic > interpretation" that sounds > quite pragmatic, but then I wonder what the conceptual > function of > referring to "a" practice is in the first place. > > To put this another way: I am unclear what a "holistic > picture" is and > how one might produce one. If we're speaking of > physical prisms, a > holistic picture means the entire apparatus of contemporary > optical > theory plus some specific data about the particular prism > and the > quality of the light that passes into it, but that likely > implies both > the existence of the prism as a separate object to be > discovered > rather than ethnographically co-produced and the existence > of a set of > global theories about the refraction of -- I would assume > -- the flow > of social action by "prismatic" practices. I am > unsure that you want > to go there, since such a perspective suggests the presence > of deeper > unities behind apparent multiplicities, in tension with > your stated > desire to preserve the facets of the practice in their > individuality. > > By all means, use the metaphor if it helps you in your work > (I'm a > pragmatist about these things). But my advice would be to > be very > clear about the logic and the value-presuppositions of > whatever > metaphor one uses (that's my Weberian streak). And for > my own part I > would also add: don't confuse a statement of scientific > ontology (what > hinds of things exist and how they exist) with a statement > of > philosophical ontology (how observers are hooked up to the > world and > how they produce knowledge). "Prismatic" seems to > me to be the former, > not the latter; as for methodology, you look to me to be > engaging in > the sort of (re)construction that is either realist or > pragmatist, and > I don't see anything prismatic about that in > particular. > > PTJ > > On Mar 7, 2009, at 4:25 PM, Aurogeeta Das wrote: > > > Thank you for your comments, Patrick, Heidi and Dvora. > I did come up > > with one result when I googled prismatic and got > Prismatic > > Metropolis: Inequality in Los Angeles, Edited by > Lawrence D. Bobo et > > al. However, I haven't found out yet exactly in > what way the term > > prismatic was used in the book. > > > > Also, I did mean prismatic very much as a metaphor. > One of the > > reasons I felt compelled to come up with a neologism, > as Patrick > > puts it, is because there was some criticism of my > having so many > > (diverse) pieces of observational data, particularly > that I was > > looking at various media, and my point was exactly > what Dvora has > > pointed out below, i.e. that none of these suggest the > practice as > > it is. You can arrive at a holistic picture only by > looking at its > > various facets. I guess what I need to articulate to > myself is what > > you have pointed out, Dvora, what - in my case, > becomes the metaphor > > for light? Perhaps the following may be useful in > clarifying > > further. It was my first rough draft for my thoughts > on prismatic, > > so excuse my own mixed metaphors as well! Note the > figurative > > meaning... > > > > "Although the word ?prismatic? has been used > with reference to > > research methods in the context of scientific studies, > what I mean > > by prismatic differs, though it also derives from the > root, ?prism?. > > A prism being defined as a triangular or rectilinear > glass object, > > ?with refracting surfaces at an acute angle with > each other, and > > that separates white light into a spectrum of > colours?, used > > figuratively with reference to ?clarification or > distortion by a > > particular viewpoint?, I use the term > ?prismatic? to describe a > > method by which a researcher clarifies a complex > practice by looking > > at its various refractions; and by understanding those > refractions, > > makes sense of the prism itself, which indeed may have > multiple > > facets and angles at variance with each other. > Furthermore, while > > the prism may appear to reflect white light, in > reality this light > > is composed of myriad colours. Similarly, while a > practice may seem > > relatively > > straightforward to interpret, it may actually consist > of multiple > > facets ? bits of prismatic light. The word > ?light? is also > > appropriate in this context, when one remembers that > one of its > > metaphors is understanding." > > > > However, this is something I am still in the process > of trying to > > articulate. What I am trying to convey is particularly > the > > incredible multifaceted quality of this practice and > how each of the > > facets appears to need its own semiotic > interpretation, if that > > makes any sense... > > === > Patrick Thaddeus Jackson > Director of General Education, American University > Editor-in-Chief, Journal of International Relations and > Development > http://www.kittenboo.com | > http://duckofminerva.blogspot.com > calendar: http://ical.mac.com/onyxdr/Patrick > > _______________________________________________ > Interpretationandmethods mailing list > Interpretationandmethods at listserv.cddc.vt.edu > http://listserv.cddc.vt.edu/mailman/listinfo/interpretationandmethods From larchap at earthlink.net Sun Mar 8 10:40:32 2009 From: larchap at earthlink.net (Larry Chappell) Date: Sun, 8 Mar 2009 10:40:32 -0400 (EDT) Subject: [Interpretationandmethods] Refraction Message-ID: <12063005.1236523232610.JavaMail.root@elwamui-norfolk.atl.sa.earthlink.net> An HTML attachment was scrubbed... URL: http://listserv.cddc.vt.edu/pipermail/interpretationandmethods/attachments/20090308/e45ee636/attachment-0001.html From D.Yanow at fsw.vu.nl Sun Mar 8 11:37:33 2009 From: D.Yanow at fsw.vu.nl (Dvora Yanow) Date: Sun, 8 Mar 2009 16:37:33 +0100 Subject: [Interpretationandmethods] Prismatic References: <615483.94962.qm@web24105.mail.ird.yahoo.com> Message-ID: <5286BEEC21FADA47A24AA92D8BC9270E028A3A7B@fswmail01.scw.vu.nl> An HTML attachment was scrubbed... URL: http://listserv.cddc.vt.edu/pipermail/interpretationandmethods/attachments/20090308/ed33fe23/attachment.html From patrickthaddeusjackson at gmail.com Sun Mar 8 22:26:02 2009 From: patrickthaddeusjackson at gmail.com (Patrick Thaddeus Jackson) Date: Sun, 8 Mar 2009 22:26:02 -0400 Subject: [Interpretationandmethods] Prismatic In-Reply-To: <5286BEEC21FADA47A24AA92D8BC9270E028A3A7B@fswmail01.scw.vu.nl> References: <615483.94962.qm@web24105.mail.ird.yahoo.com> <5286BEEC21FADA47A24AA92D8BC9270E028A3A7B@fswmail01.scw.vu.nl> Message-ID: <3E2E410C-1C61-4182-B30E-48072CB58332@gmail.com> To my way of thinking, Dvora makes an interesting slippage here: from a sociology of science observation (an accurate one) about what people do, to a philosophy of science claim about logical connection. Just because "there are people who want to talk about phenomenological methods" does not, as far as I am concerned, have any implications for the philosophical argument about the difference between method and methodology; instead, it either means that a) people involved in doing this kind of research aren't all that concerned with the logical coherence of their philosophical positions (which seems likely true) or that b) such people are not defining "phenomenology" as a methodology, but as a collection of techniques (i.e. a method), which would eliminate the logical problem. And there is a logical problem, inasmuch as there is no necessary connection between what one thinks about how an observer is plugged into the world and what kinds of objects one thinks exists in the world. To pass seamlessly from one to the other is to commit exactly the same kind of fallacy as is involved in the nonsensical (but often repeated!) red herring "quantitative methodology." Counting stuff is not a methodology; it's a method, a technique. By the same token, not counting stuff isn't a methodology either; it's a rejection of a particular technique. Exactly the same is, I would claim, true of other kinds of combinations, like pragmatism and participant- observation: the former is a methodology, the latter is a method, and there is zippo logical connection between them. There's no reason they can't be combined, but there's no reason that they have to be. I do not agree with Dvora that "there is a class of 'methods' that don't separate their 'tools/techniques' (whether of data generation or of analysis) from their methodology" although I will readily assent to the proposition that there are groups of *researchers* that don't separate their tools/techniques from their methodology. I just think that such people are, in a philosophically important sense, wrong. This doesn't mean that they don't produce good work; it just means that their self-justification for why they do what they do is not exactly consistent. And it means that their justification might, whether intentionally or unintentionally, foreclose options -- nonstandard combinations of philosophical and scientific ontologies -- by yoking a method to a methodology and ruling out other combinations in advance. That said, two more points before I turn back to getting this philosophy of science presentation ready for tomorrow (it'll be podcast on kittenboo.com like most of my stuff is, if anyone's interested). 1) in my way of thinking, 'ethnography' names a set of methods. Methodologically, it seems to be the case that most self-identified ethnographers these days are monists rather than dualists, but again, I see no necessary reason why that would have to be the case. Empirically, it also seems to be the case that most self-identified ethnographers are unwilling to separate their methods from their methodology, but that's fine -- after all, they are not doing philosophy of science, they are producing knowledge. 2) if methods and methodologies are conjoined, it is difficult to see how one would ever justify one's choice of method/methodology except on realist grounds. Suppose I'm an ethnographer, studying my subject population via participant-observation, and someone asks me why I'm doing it this way and not, say, by taking random samples and administering surveys; I reply by talking about the richness of social life actually lived and the productivity of the observational gaze. But this, in turn, is either a statement about the character of the object of analysis, or it is a statement about the character of the observer -- in either case, it's a statement about a dispositional essence that justifies the choices I make as a researcher. And that's realism: the world, with its own essential character, tells us how to go about knowing it. The problem is that realism is a contested and contestable position in the philosophy of science, and there's no place from which to contest it unless methods and methodologies are separated; if they are conjoined, then we're all tacit realists, relying on some unthematized hunches about the nature of what we're studying as a way of grounding our approaches. My whole project here is to get us past that, and into a place where we can think about what we get practically by combining methods and methodologies, without having to worry about the putatively essential characters of anything. In other words: I want to say that not all statements about "the world" and the objects in it imply a dualist metaphysics separating mind and world and an associated representational notion of knowledge, but I can't do that if methodologies entail methods and vice versa. Fortunately, I have yet to see a logically or philosophically compelling argument that necessarily links a method to a methodology; I only see historical and sociological ones, which are empirically interesting but philosophically irrelevant. Okay, back to preparing presentation slides. PTJ On Mar 8, 2009, at 11:37 AM, Dvora Yanow wrote: > And more to Patrick, too, on your last post in light of Aurogeeta's > comment here: > > There is a class of 'methods' that don't separate their 'tools/ > techniques' (whether of data generation or of analysis) from their > methodology. Ethnography comes to mind as one of these. > > I wonder if this 'prism' idea might be another of these -- or > usefully illustrate some of their 'properties'. > > I wonder what one gains from calling the practice a prism? It > doesn't seem such to me necessarily, although 'seeing'/treating is > prismatically makes it look like one. > > Does the notion of prism have a theory built in? I think so, and > your discussion of the reality status of the 'refractions' that it > makes appear seems to me evidence of that. > > I know you want to be able to separate methodology from methods, but > I'm not sure we can do that in all cases. Phenomenology, for > example -- there are people who want to talk about phenomenological > methods. > > More crucially for this question, tho, you are pointing to the > ontological discussion that Aurogeeta would need to engage in re. > the refractions, taken together. This reminds me of Picasso's > drawings/paintings, showing impossible angles in the same plane. > Some people take this to be more realist; others have seen it as a > composite of multiple perspectives that does not amount to the > 'real' object/subject [a colleague and I have discussed this, by > contrast with Rembrandt realist and Pollock drip paintings, in > 'Methodology by Metaphor: Ways of Seeing in Painting and Research," > Organization Studies 29: 23-44 [2008]). > > Dvora > > === Patrick Thaddeus Jackson Director of General Education, American University Editor-in-Chief, Journal of International Relations and Development http://www.kittenboo.com | http://duckofminerva.blogspot.com calendar: http://ical.mac.com/onyxdr/Patrick -------------- next part -------------- An HTML attachment was scrubbed... URL: http://listserv.cddc.vt.edu/pipermail/interpretationandmethods/attachments/20090308/bcfeda70/attachment-0001.html From D.Yanow at fsw.vu.nl Mon Mar 9 07:46:10 2009 From: D.Yanow at fsw.vu.nl (Dvora Yanow) Date: Mon, 9 Mar 2009 12:46:10 +0100 Subject: [Interpretationandmethods] re discussion of prismatic In-Reply-To: <9019142A-BFE7-44DE-AB70-A4CE9EC4BF73@uchicago.edu> References: <9019142A-BFE7-44DE-AB70-A4CE9EC4BF73@uchicago.edu> Message-ID: <5286BEEC21FADA47A24AA92D8BC9270E01FBBF76@fswmail01.scw.vu.nl> Thanks, Lloyd - but my computer doesn't know how to open the file. Any ideas? Also, was just looking at your subjective knowledge essay, which you posted a week or so ago. I remember reading it when it first came out, but I don't recall where it appeared, and that information isn't on it. Would you mind posting the cite to the list? Thanks, Dvora And P.S., yes, one of the things we were hoping the list would do is serve as a place for people not only to announce their own work but also to point to other sources that might be of interest. If it gets too much, we might have to ask that we go to lists rather than attachments, but I've heard no complaints so far. Dvora Yanow ________________________________ From: Lloyd Rudolph [mailto:lrudolph at uchicago.edu] Sent: Monday, March 09, 2009 8:44 AM To: interpretationandmethods at malagigi.cddc.vt.edu Cc: swarts at amdromeda.rutgers.edu; Jackson Patrick; Dvora Yanow Subject: re discussion of prismatic Friends, I don't know if it is allowed or not by I am attaching an excellent discussion of the Jain view of truth as multifaceted [ane-kanta-vada]. It is a view that influenced Gandhi's concepts of satyagraha and ahimsa. At the same time it is a well-worked out epistemological position. -------------- next part -------------- An HTML attachment was scrubbed... URL: http://listserv.cddc.vt.edu/pipermail/interpretationandmethods/attachments/20090309/a6414fd0/attachment.html From lrudolph at uchicago.edu Mon Mar 9 03:44:16 2009 From: lrudolph at uchicago.edu (Lloyd Rudolph) Date: Mon, 9 Mar 2009 13:14:16 +0530 Subject: [Interpretationandmethods] re discussion of prismatic Message-ID: <9019142A-BFE7-44DE-AB70-A4CE9EC4BF73@uchicago.edu> Friends, I don't know if it is allowed or not by I am attaching an excellent discussion of the Jain view of truth as multifaceted [ane-kanta-vada]. It is a view that influenced Gandhi's concepts of satyagraha and ahimsa. At the same time it is a well-worked out epistemological position. Professor of Political Science Emeritus University of Chicago email: lrudolph at uchicago.edu. USA cell: 510-499-4740 India cell: 0-94140-52178 Jan - March: A 57 Shanti Path, Tilak Nagar, Jaipur, Rajasthan 302004, India. Ph +91-141-402-2876. Fax +91-141-262-3015 April - May and October - December: 2 Ardmore Road, Kensington, CA 9 4707, USA. Ph +510-526-3589. Fax 510-526-8637 June - September: Box 117, 6298 Stage Road, Barnard, VT 05031, USA. Ph +802-234-9844. Fax 802-234-5261 -------------- next part -------------- An HTML attachment was scrubbed... URL: http://listserv.cddc.vt.edu/pipermail/interpretationandmethods/attachments/20090309/7c80ddcd/attachment-0002.html -------------- next part -------------- A non-text attachment was scrubbed... Name: Anekantavada - Wikipedia.webarchive Type: application/octet-stream Size: 425173 bytes Desc: not available Url : http://listserv.cddc.vt.edu/pipermail/interpretationandmethods/attachments/20090309/7c80ddcd/attachment-0001.obj -------------- next part -------------- An HTML attachment was scrubbed... URL: http://listserv.cddc.vt.edu/pipermail/interpretationandmethods/attachments/20090309/7c80ddcd/attachment-0003.html From baljit at gmail.com Mon Mar 9 14:19:26 2009 From: baljit at gmail.com (Baljit Grewal) Date: Tue, 10 Mar 2009 07:19:26 +1300 Subject: [Interpretationandmethods] re discussion of prismatic In-Reply-To: <5286BEEC21FADA47A24AA92D8BC9270E01FBBF76@fswmail01.scw.vu.nl> References: <9019142A-BFE7-44DE-AB70-A4CE9EC4BF73@uchicago.edu> <5286BEEC21FADA47A24AA92D8BC9270E01FBBF76@fswmail01.scw.vu.nl> Message-ID: Hi Dvora, This is a wikipedia article saved with an webarchive extension. Possibly the article was saved on the Apple Safari browser. Instead of trying to open it just visit the wikipedia site URL: http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Anekantavada Baljit On Tue, Mar 10, 2009 at 12:46 AM, Dvora Yanow wrote: > Thanks, Lloyd ? but my computer doesn?t know how to open the file. > > > > Any ideas? > > > > Also, was just looking at your subjective knowledge essay, which you posted > a week or so ago. I remember reading it when it first came out, but I don?t > recall where it appeared, and that information isn?t on it. > > > > Would you mind posting the cite to the list? > > > > Thanks, > > Dvora > > > > And P.S., yes, one of the things we were hoping the list would do is serve > as a place for people not only to announce their own work but also to point > to other sources that might be of interest. If it gets too much, we might > have to ask that we go to lists rather than attachments, but I?ve heard no > complaints so far. > > > > Dvora Yanow > ------------------------------ > > *From:* Lloyd Rudolph [mailto:lrudolph at uchicago.edu] > *Sent:* Monday, March 09, 2009 8:44 AM > *To:* interpretationandmethods at malagigi.cddc.vt.edu > *Cc:* swarts at amdromeda.rutgers.edu; Jackson Patrick; Dvora Yanow > *Subject:* re discussion of prismatic > > > > Friends, > > I don't know if it is allowed or not by I am attaching an > excellent discussion of the Jain view of truth as multifaceted > [ane-kanta-vada]. It is a view that influenced Gandhi's concepts of > satyagraha and ahimsa. At the same time it is a well-worked out > epistemological position. > > > > _______________________________________________ > Interpretationandmethods mailing list > Interpretationandmethods at listserv.cddc.vt.edu > http://listserv.cddc.vt.edu/mailman/listinfo/interpretationandmethods > > -------------- next part -------------- An HTML attachment was scrubbed... URL: http://listserv.cddc.vt.edu/pipermail/interpretationandmethods/attachments/20090310/b8495402/attachment.html From lrudolph at uchicago.edu Tue Mar 10 03:22:23 2009 From: lrudolph at uchicago.edu (Lloyd Rudolph) Date: Tue, 10 Mar 2009 12:52:23 +0530 Subject: [Interpretationandmethods] re discussion of prismatic In-Reply-To: <5286BEEC21FADA47A24AA92D8BC9270E01FBBF76@fswmail01.scw.vu.nl> References: <9019142A-BFE7-44DE-AB70-A4CE9EC4BF73@uchicago.edu> <5286BEEC21FADA47A24AA92D8BC9270E01FBBF76@fswmail01.scw.vu.nl> Message-ID: <1E4626AF-ECF3-4570-9B87-6B74F5D07368@uchicago.edu> The reference for the subjective knowledge article is: * ?Engaging Subjective Knowledge: How Amar Singh?s Diary Narratives of and By the Self Help Explain Identity Politics,? Perspectives on Politics, Vol. 1, No. 4 December 2003. I am attaching a PDF of the article relevant to the "prismatic" disucssion. Will answer separately re Cafe matters. Lloyd On Mar 9, 2009, at 5:16 PM, Dvora Yanow wrote: > Thanks, Lloyd ? but my computer doesn?t know how to open the file. > > Any ideas? > > Also, was just looking at your subjective knowledge essay, which you > posted a week or so ago. I remember reading it when it first came > out, but I don?t recall where it appeared, and that information > isn?t on it. > > Would you mind posting the cite to the list? > > Thanks, > Dvora > > And P.S., yes, one of the things we were hoping the list would do is > serve as a place for people not only to announce their own work but > also to point to other sources that might be of interest. If it > gets too much, we might have to ask that we go to lists rather than > attachments, but I?ve heard no complaints so far. > > Dvora Yanow > From: Lloyd Rudolph [mailto:lrudolph at uchicago.edu] > Sent: Monday, March 09, 2009 8:44 AM > To: interpretationandmethods at malagigi.cddc.vt.edu > Cc: swarts at amdromeda.rutgers.edu; Jackson Patrick; Dvora Yanow > Subject: re discussion of prismatic > > Friends, > I don't know if it is allowed or not by I am attaching > an excellent discussion of the Jain view of truth as multifaceted > [ane-kanta-vada]. It is a view that influenced Gandhi's concepts of > satyagraha and ahimsa. At the same time it is a well-worked out > epistemological position. > Professor of Political Science Emeritus University of Chicago email: lrudolph at uchicago.edu. USA cell: 510-499-4740 India cell: 0-94140-52178 Jan - March: A 57 Shanti Path, Tilak Nagar, Jaipur, Rajasthan 302004, India. Ph +91-141-402-2876. Fax +91-141-262-3015 April - May and October - December: 2 Ardmore Road, Kensington, CA 9 4707, USA. Ph +510-526-3589. Fax 510-526-8637 June - September: Box 117, 6298 Stage Road, Barnard, VT 05031, USA. Ph +802-234-9844. Fax 802-234-5261 -------------- next part -------------- An HTML attachment was scrubbed... URL: http://listserv.cddc.vt.edu/pipermail/interpretationandmethods/attachments/20090310/7d44a730/attachment-0002.html -------------- next part -------------- A non-text attachment was scrubbed... Name: Anekantavada - Wikipedia,.pdf Type: application/pdf Size: 413999 bytes Desc: not available Url : http://listserv.cddc.vt.edu/pipermail/interpretationandmethods/attachments/20090310/7d44a730/attachment-0001.pdf -------------- next part -------------- An HTML attachment was scrubbed... URL: http://listserv.cddc.vt.edu/pipermail/interpretationandmethods/attachments/20090310/7d44a730/attachment-0003.html From D.Yanow at fsw.vu.nl Thu Mar 12 06:17:44 2009 From: D.Yanow at fsw.vu.nl (Dvora Yanow) Date: Thu, 12 Mar 2009 11:17:44 +0100 Subject: [Interpretationandmethods] FW: CFP 4th Nordic Conference on Cultural Policy Research References: <426357.63649.qm@web24612.mail.ird.yahoo.com> A<0EA762C317C807498E76A6F1E5172136281FE4BA@ivm-mail> Message-ID: <5286BEEC21FADA47A24AA92D8BC9270E028A3AFC@fswmail01.scw.vu.nl> An HTML attachment was scrubbed... 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URL: http://listserv.cddc.vt.edu/pipermail/interpretationandmethods/attachments/20090322/3a115e14/attachment.html From jhuns at vt.edu Mon Mar 23 11:23:26 2009 From: jhuns at vt.edu (jeremy hunsinger) Date: Mon, 23 Mar 2009 11:23:26 -0400 Subject: [Interpretationandmethods] CFP: Learning Infrastructures in the Social Sciences and Humanities Message-ID: apologies for x-posting, distribute as appropriate -jh CFP: Learning Infrastructures in the Social Sciences and Humanities Special issue of the journal Learning Inquiry (http://www.springerlink.com/content/120592/ ) Edited by Jeremy Hunsinger Papers Due: May 15th 2009 Please contact the editor to discuss topics at jhuns.(@)vt.edu (remove brackets) In the last 20 years, the learning infrastructures of the social sciences and humanities have transformed dramatically toward a more plural set of practices, methods, systems, and tools. In this issue, we are looking for contributions from social informatics, humanistic informatics, cultural informatics, digital humanities, internet studies, design research, media studies, and related fields dealing with the learning infrastructures. I am seeking papers that deal empirically, analytically and/or critically with the learning infrastructures in the social sciences and humanities. Cyberinfrastructures, physical infrastructures and organizational infrastructures have been transformed through the politics, economics, and technologies surrounding our learning infrastructures. Learning infrastructures are part of professors and students scholarly experiences everyday. These infrastructures are part of how students begin their engagement with the social sciences and humanities and perhaps become part of how they maintain that engagement throughout their lives. Beyond our professors, departments, centers and institutes, our learning infrastructures are mediating our disciplinarity and interdisciplinarities to our students. In short, learning infrastructures are a part of how students learn to be scholars in various disciplines and citizens in the world-at-large. Part of the debate surrounding learning infrastructures in the social sciences and humanities is the over/under-definition and over/ underdetermination of terms such as learning and infrastructure in disciplinary and interdisciplinary discourses. In this CFP, I want to encourage papers that help to define and critically engages those terms. Possible topics: ? Transformation of institutions in relation to learning infrastructures ? New methods, new understandings in the social sciences and humanities related to learning infrastructures ? New disciplines, interdisciplines and transdisciplines and learning infrastructures ? Political economics of learning infrastructures ? Ethics, norms, and politics surrounding learning infrastructures ? Openness and/or closedness in learning infrastructures ? Social/Cultural/Informatics informatics and learning infrastructures ? New directions for learning infrastructures based on social sciences and humanities ? Cultural environmentalism and learning infrastructures ? Knowledge/Design ecologies and learning infrastructures Review process will be double blind peer review following editorial selection. We expect to place fewer than 8 papers in this special issue. We would prefer papers between 4000-16000 words. Papers should be submitted tohttp://www.editorialmanager.com/linq/ Please contact the editor to discuss your paper and/or when you submit your paper. Jeremy Hunsinger Center for Digital Discourse and Culture Virginia Tech Information Ethics Fellow Center for Information Policy Research http://www.stswiki.org/ sts wiki http://cfp.learning-inquiry.info/ Learning Inquiry-the journal http://transdisciplinarystudies.tmttlt.com/ Transdisciplinary Studies:the book series I am always doing that which I can not do, in order that I may learn how to do it. -Pablo Picasso From D.Yanow at fsw.vu.nl Mon Mar 30 05:35:22 2009 From: D.Yanow at fsw.vu.nl (Dvora Yanow) Date: Mon, 30 Mar 2009 11:35:22 +0200 Subject: [Interpretationandmethods] Language, Culture and Mind Conference Announcement References: Message-ID: <5286BEEC21FADA47A24AA92D8BC9270E028A3BFB@fswmail01.scw.vu.nl> An HTML attachment was scrubbed... URL: http://listserv.cddc.vt.edu/pipermail/interpretationandmethods/attachments/20090330/dd9ea83e/attachment.html